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Characterization and Assignment of
Corporate and Shareholder Income
DANIEL

M. SCHNEIDER*

INTRODUCTION

Any differential-between economic benefits included and excluded from income, between deductible and nondeductible expenses,
between receipt of income now and next year, or among tax rates
imposed on taxable income-is exploited by taxpayers determined to
reduce their tax. This observation has been especially accurate when
describing the taxation of corporations and their shareholders. But
the complexity of corporate tax is such that these differences in
taxation, however incremental, are not one dimensional. It is not as
if one always tries to convert ordinary income into capital gain.
Instead, this differential cuts both ways. Shareholders who are not
corporations-e.g., individuals or estates-prefer capital gain to ordinary income; a redemption, for example, always is better than a
dividend because the tax rates imposed on the former is less than
those imposed on the latter. 1 But shareholders who are themselves
corporations prefer ordinary income-specifically dividends-to capital gain, again because of tax rates, because they may deduct from
70% to 100% of the dividends paid to them. 2 This two-way street
leads to an extraordinarily rich set of cases surrounding some of the
most basic aspects of corporate tax: is the transaction a dividend and
whose dividend is it?
To a large extent, these differentials are determined by statutes.
But these statutory guidelines are not absolute, and so a rich fabric
of judicial gloss also stretches across the differentials. These judicial
glosses are the subject of this article.
© Daniel M. Schneider
* Daniel M. Schneider, Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College

of Law. This article is based on a chapter from a forthcoming book by Professor
Schneider about the federal income taxation of corporate distributions, to be published by Warren Gorham Lamont.
1. See I.R.C. § 302 (1993) (redemptions); I.R.C. § 301(c)(1) (1993) (dividends);
I.R.C. § 1 (1993) (tax rates imposed on capital gain and upon ordinary income).
2. See I.R.C. § 243 (1993) (deduction for dividends received); I.R.C. § 1201
(1993) (capital gains tax imposed on corporations).
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A current review of the differentials reflected in the payment of
dividends is beneficial for two reasons. First, restating the law is
intrinsically meritorious. Second, extraordinary revision of the federal
income taxation of corporations and their shareholders has been
proposed by those who would "integrate" the taxes on corporations
and their shareholders so that corporate income is taxed only "once."
It is clearly premature to suggest what differentials would remain or
would surface anew, were these two taxes integrated. Integration is
by no means certain,3 its form is unclear, 4 and its popularity is not
unanimous.'
Integration demands the elimination of "double taxation." ' 6 The
income of a "C" corporation-a corporation that is not an "S"
corporation-is taxed "twice." It is taxed once as the corporation
earns the income under section 11 of the Internal Revenue Code. Its
income is also taxed if, and when, it distributes dividends to its
shareholders, because they are taxed upon the receipt of dividends
under section 301(c)(1). In contrast, "S" corporations and partnerships are not taxed at all; only their shareholders or partners are
taxed on the business's income. A simple but inefficient mode of
integration is merely for a corporation to make deductible payments
to shareholders in amounts that match its income.
3. See generally Martin D. Ginsburg, Maintaining Subchapter S in an Integrated Tax World, 47 TAX L. REV. 665 (1992) ("general corporate-shareholder
integration is not an idea whose time has yet come, but it is definitely an idea whose
time will not go") (citation omitted). Integration is discussed in the issue of the Tax
Law Review in which Professor Ginsburg's article appears, which is entirely devoted
to a symposium on the topic. See generally 47 TAX L. REV. 427-724 (1992).
4. Two principle forms of integration-exempting dividends from tax at the
shareholder level because the source of the income, corporate earnings, has been
taxed; and crediting shareholders for corporate taxes paid upon the earnings distributed to them-are discussed in detail in the symposium issue, supra note 3. See
George K. Yin, Corporate Tax Integration and the Search for the Pragmatic Ideal,
47 TAX L. REV. 431 (1992); Michael L. Schler, Taxing Corporate Income Once (or
Hopefully Not at All): A Practitioner's Comparison of the Treasury and ALI
Integration Models, 47 TAX L. REv. 509 (1992). The dividend exclusion model is set
forth in

TREASURY DEP'T, REPORT OF INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPO-

BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992). The crediting of taxes is
suggested by ALVIN C. WARREN, REPORTER'S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION,
FED. INCOME TAX PROJECT (1993). Histories preceding the ALI proposal, following
the Treasury Department Report, and other alternatives are examined in detail by
these two articles, as well as others contained in the symposium issue.
5. See Yin, supra note 4, at n.3.
6. For examples of double taxation, see infra notes 49-53 and accompanying
RATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAxING

text.

7. "S" corporations and partnerships are noted infra note 49.
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Example 1. Corporation X has $100,000 of gross income. It
pays $100,000 6f salary to its president and sole shareholder,
A. X deducts the $100,000 under section 162(a). X's income
is taxed only once, in the hands of A.
Unfortunately, the Xs and As of this world cannot predictably match
income and deductible payments. Thus, scholars engage in a quest
for other methods of integration.
The mode, if any, much less the time, if ever, of integration is
unclear. Were the deduction for interest eliminated as part of integrating the corporate and individual income taxes, some constructive
dividend cases, such as those addressing whether a payment to a
shareholder is interest on a loan or a dividend, would be rendered
meaningless. Still, other questions might easily remain, such as characterizing income and identifying the recipient of income.8 In the
meantime, differentials remain. With this caveat in mind, the article
reviews the current state of differentials, most commonly viewed as
the characterization and assignment of corporate and shareholder
income.
Thus, the taxation of "C" corporations presents several questions, which are addressed in the remainder of this article. One major
topic in this area concerns the assignment of income, posing questions
such as whether a shareholder can assign a dividend she is just about
to receive? It also is necessary to understand the differential in tax
rates between dividends and capital gain, for noncorporate shareholders, primarily individuals, and for corporate shareholders. One of the
forms in which characterization has been cast follows the Waterman
Steamship case, 9 where a distribution was made to the corporate

owner of a corporation just before the latter was sold to another
party. Was the distribution a dividend, as the seller would have
preferred, or capital gain from the sale of stock? Finally, shareholders,
often individuals, frequently try to characterize their use of corporate
assets as a transaction that minimizes tax liability, e.g., the corporation has paid a salary to the shareholder which it can deduct, while
the Internal Revenue Service counters that this payment is, in fact, a
dividend that it cannot deduct.
8. Schler, supra note 4, suggests the adverse impact of failing to account for
debt if integration occurs. Id. at 531-536. He also notes the effect of integration on
the tension between ordinary income and capital gain. Id. at 530-531, 541-555.
9. For a discussion of Waterman Steamship, see infra text accompanying
notes 58-74.
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WHOSE INCOME? - ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME QUESTIONS

It should not be surprising that taxpayers and the Internal
Revenue Service argue about the person to whom a distribution
belongs. While the taxation of a corporate distribution is relatively
certain, 0 there is room for play as to whose income the distribution
actually is. Obviously, simple cases do not present a problem. If A
owns Corporation X's stock both before and after a distribution, that
distribution is taxed to A. However, a shareholder might sell the
stock; she might transfer the right to receive distributions from the
stock. Therefore, to whom distributions should be taxed in these and
in comparable situations is the subject now addressed.
A.

ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME

A shareholder who realizes that she is about to receive a dividend
may consider transferring the right to receive that dividend. She may
even consider transferring the stock with respect to which the dividend
is paid. Will these transfers constitute an effective assignment of
income? Generally, this area is subject to the same xules that govern
the assignment of income elsewhere in federal income tax.' Rules are
always subject to exceptions, however, and so specific principles that
have been established in this area are discussed below.
In Dunham v. Commissioner,12 the taxpayer created short-term
trusts for the benefit of her children. The apparent simplicity of the
case notwithstanding, the Tax Court held that the "trusts" used to
achieve the assignment were not trusts for federal income tax purposes. The "trusts" being an ineffective vehicle, the taxpayer needed,
but was unable to find, another rationale in order to prevail. General
assignment of income principles that require a taxpayer to assign the
10. But see text accompanying notes 58-74 infra (characterization of distribution
as dividend or as capital gain) and infra notes 75-196 (characterization of dividend
as deductible payment).
11. See generally James S. Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and Assignment of Income - The Ferrer Case, 20 TAX L. REV. 1 (1964); Charles S. Lyon and
James S. Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G.
Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REV. 293 (1962); Lloyd G. Soll, Intra-Family Assignments:
Attributions and Realization of Income, 6 TAX L. REV. 435 (1951) and 7 TAX L.
REv. 61 (1951); Ralph S. Rice, Judicial Trends in GratuitousAssignments to Avoid

FederalIncome Taxes, 64 YALE L.J. 991 (1955).
12. 35 T.C. 515 (1961) (acq.). See also Overton v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 155
(2d Cir. 1947) (taxpayers transferred stock subject to restrictions to their wives;
dividends taxed to taxpayers).
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the "fruit"
"tree" to another person in order to effectively assign
3
required that the taxpayer be taxed on the dividends.
In another family setting, an effective assignment was made. In
Heminway v. Commissioner,14 a brother was held not to have received
dividends when he had bought stock from his sister upon which the
dividends were declared, subject to her retained interest for life in the
dividends declared on the stock. Because both the sale and the retained
life estate were effective, the sister, not the taxpayer, was taxed on
the dividends.
General principles also precluded the assignment of taxable rights
to receive stock dividends in Choate v. Commissioner." These rights
were issued three weeks before they were assigned by the taxpayer,
and then exercised by the donees, who were members of the taxpayer's
family, two days after the assignment. Citing a seminal assignment
of income case, Helvering v. Horst, 6 among other cases, the Second
Circuit held -that the distributions were taxable to the taxpayer, not
the donees.
In United States v. Georgia R.R. and Banking Co., 17 the lessee
of corporate stock under a long-term, ninety-nine year, lease was
deemed to be the owner of the stock. Thus, the lessor, nominal owner
of the stock, was not considered to have received dividends upon
which it could take the section 243 dividends received deduction. 8
Again, more general assignment of income principles characterized
the "lease" as effectively assigning ownership of the leased propertythe stock-to someone other than the lessor/taxpayer, rendering the
transaction into an effective assignment of income.
It is difficult to establish broad guidelines by which to plan the
transfer of dividends or the stock underlying the dividend. That
transfers frequently are made among members of a family hampers,
but does not necessarily destroy, a transferor's ability to assign the
dividend to the transferee. General assignment of income principles
are often applied in this area, and require that the transferor truly
13. Compare Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) (effective assignment
of income) with Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (ineffective assignment of
income).
14. 44 T.C. 69 (1959) (acq.).
15. 129 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1942).
16. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
17. 348 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 973 (1966).
18. Section 243 generally permits a shareholder to deduction 70% of the
dividends it has received from a corporation in which it owns stock. However, the
recipient must be a corporation in order to enjoy this deduction. For more discussion
of the dividends received deduction, see infra text at note 57.
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divest herself of any interest in the dividend if it is to be taxed to the
transferee.
B.

DIVIDENDS ATTACHED TO STOCK WHICH HAS BEEN SOLD

Stock is sometimes sold when the right to receive a dividend has
ripened and is about to bear fruit. Regulation section 1.61-9(c) sets
forth the general rule that, "[w]hen stock is sold, and a dividend is
both declared and paid after the sale, such dividend is not gross
income to the seller." It continues, however, to state in a less clear
manner that,
When stock is sold after the declaration of a dividend and
after the date as of which the seller becomes entitled to the
dividend, the dividend is ordinarily income to the seller. When
stock is sold between the time of declaration and the time of
payment of the dividend, and the sale takes place at such time
that the purchaser becomes entitled to the dividend, the dividend is ordinarily income to him.' 9
In other words,
-the dividend is taxed to the seller if the underlying stock was
sold after the dividend was declared and after the seller
becomes entitled to the dividend; and
-the dividend is taxed to the buyer if the
-dividend is declared and paid after the sale occurs, or
-stock is sold after the dividend has been declared, before
it has been paid, such that the buyer becomes entitled to
the dividend.
While the standard in this area, the regulation nevertheless offers little
guidance, primarily because it does not reveal when a sale has
occurred, much less when a dividend either has been declared or paid,
or who is entitled to the dividend.
Instead, boundaries are set by two dates especially familiar to
shareholders who have bought and sold publicly traded stock. They
are the "record date"-when a shareholder must own stock in order
to receive a dividend-and the "ex-dividend date"-the date before
which the seller is entitled to a dividend that has been declared, even
though it has not yet been paid. These terms are amplified and the
subject of contention in Silco, Inc. v. United States,20 and Revenue
Ruling 82-11.2 1 In these cases, the ex-dividend date was said usually
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-9(c) (emphasis added).
20. 779 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1986).
21. 1982-1 C.B. 51.
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to precede the record date by four days-it ordinarily took an
exchange four days to record the change of ownership when stock
was sold. Thus, the price of the stock usually drops after the exdividend date and not after the record date in order to reflect exactly
when the seller is entitled to the dividend. 22 It might seem that
dividends paid on stock transferred before the ex-dividend date will
be taxed to the seller and dividends paid on stock transferred after
the record date will be taxed to the buyer. The former date marks
when the seller must own the stock in order to receive the dividend,
and the latter date marks when a shareholder must own stock on
order to receive a dividend paid on the stock. This would leave a gap
in the middle, between the two dates, where taxation would be unclear.
However, case law indicates that the record date is controlling, so
that a dividend paid on any transfer before that date would be taxed
to the seller, not the buyer and any subsequent transfer would be
taxed to the buyer. 23 Thus, tax law tends to follow, but is not identical
with, state law governing the payment of dividends.
Example 2. Assume that the ex-dividend date for stock was
March 15. The record date ordinarily would be March 19.
Dividends on stock sold before March 16 would be taxed to
the seller, because she must own the stock on March 15 in
order to receive a dividend declared on that date. Dividends
on stock sold on or after March 19, however, would be taxed
to the buyer. Dividends on stock sold on March 16, 17, or 18
also would be taxed to the seller.
In both Silco and Revenue Ruling 82-11, the record date preceded
the ex-dividend date. The Internal Revenue Service determined that
the buyer was not entitled to the section 243 deduction because it was
not the "owner" of the stock on the record date. The court in Silco,
however, refused to follow the ruling. In part, the Silco taxpayer had
relied on the Internal Revenue Service's announced position when it
22. Silco, 779 F.2d at 284.
23. Cases in which dividends paid on stock transferred after the record date
have been taxed to the transferor include Newman v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 921
(1943), and Rev. Rul. 74-562, 1974-2 C.B. 28. On the other hand, cases in which
dividends paid on stock transferred before the record date which were taxed to the
transferee include the leading case of Estate of Putnam v. Commissioner, 324 U.S.
393 (1945), as well as Caruth Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989)
and Machette v. Helvering, 81 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 677 (1936).
Rev. Rul. 74-562 criticized Machette as being inconsistent with the subsequently
decided Horst case.
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took its section 243 deduction. Although the Service opposed such a
stance in Revenue Ruling 82-11, it had not taken this adverse position
until after the Silco taxpayer had acted in reliance upon the Service's
stated position.
However, Silco and Revenue Ruling 82-11-and, indeed, the
general rule that dividends are taxed to the owner of the stock as of
the record date-are not the only signposts of the person to whom
transferred dividends should be taxed. Often, reference is made to
more general principles regarding the assignment of income.
In Caruth Corp. v. United States, 4 the Fifth Circuit seemed to
take a more general view, one that did not necessarily get involved
with record or ex-dividend dates. Here, a charitable contribution was
made of nonvoting preferred stock by a shareholder days before a
dividend was declared and, subsequently, paid on the stock. He owned
most of the stock of the corporation declaring the dividend. Several
months after the contribution of the stock and payment of the
dividend, the corporation redeemed this stock, reacquiring the stock
apparently independently of the original gift.
Because Regulation section 1.61-9(c) would not have led to the
taxpayer/controlling shareholder being taxed on the dividends, the
Internal Revenue Service was forced to resort to more general principles regarding assignment of income. While the closely held nature
of the corporation was suggestive of manipulation, it was insufficient
to have the dividends taxed to the controlling shareholder. He had
given away the stock-the "tree"-such that the dividends-the "fruit"
- could not be taxed to him.
Transfers made within a family may be treated differently than
transfers made between unrelated parties. Family status was fatal in
Estate of Smith v. Commissioner.25 As in Caruth, the stock was
transferred shortly before a dividend was to be paid by a closely held
corporation, but long after it had been declared. Transferring the
stock but keeping one of the primary benefits of owning that stockreceipt of the dividend-was influential in the court's decision to tax
the dividend to the taxpayers, not to the children to whom they had
transferred the stock. Although unstated by the court, it was almost
as if the taxpayers were being taxed on the receipt of the dividends

24. 865 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1989).
25. 292 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 967 (1962). See generally

Janet A. Meade, Assignment of Income: Gifts of Stock and Dividend Income, 68

TAXES 87 (1990) (discussing Caruth and Smith).
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because they might have been taxed on them. The timing, in which
the stock was transferred three weeks after the dividend was declared
and one day before the record date, also, was important.
A somewhat similar situation presented itself in Bishop v. Shaughnessy, 26 where dividends paid on preferred stock that had been given
by shareholders of the stock of a closely held corporation to members
of their family were not taxed to the shareholders. The irrevocable
nature of the transfer of the stock to the family members and the
fact that the transferors did not control this corporation were more
critical to the court than the fact that the transfer was made to family
members. Therefore, the dividends were not taxed to the transferors.
Unlike Caruth, the transferors in Bishop did not control the corporation.
Two other contrary cases also are presented in Revenue Ruling
60-331 ,27 and Revenue Ruling 74-562.28 In Revenue Ruling 60-331,
stock was transferred after shareholders knew a dividend would be
paid in order to avoid a penalty tax-the personal holding company
tax29-and shortly before the payment was actually made. Their
apparent desire was to avoid being taxed on the dividend and, because
no business purpose attached to the transfer, the dividend was taxed
to the shareholders, not to the transferee. This ruling might be limited
to its facts, however, as a specific dividend was being paid in order
to mitigate a penalty tax.
The facts of Revenue Ruling 74-562 are somewhat broader, but
still seem fairly specific. There, dividends were declared with respect
to stock owned by an estate, for shareholders as of that date. About
five weeks later, the person who held an income interest for life in
the estate assigned her entire interest to a charity such that, when the
dividends were paid to the estate the next day, the executor distributed
the dividends to the charity, not the original holder of the life estate.
Because "the right to receive the dividends had accrued to the" holder
of the life estate "when the dividends were declared," she was taxed
on them. To some extent, this ruling comports with the rules set forth
in the regulations, which ask if the owner of stock becomes entitled

26. 195 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1952).
27. 1960-2 C.B. 189.
28. 1974-2 C.B. 28.
29. The personal holding company tax is imposed by §§ 541-545 on closely
held corporations with too much "passive" income (e.g., dividends, interest, royal-
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to a dividend, who then owns the stock?30 The narrowness of the
ruling's facts, the charitable contribution of stock by the beneficiary
of an estate followed by the corporation's payment of dividends on
the stock, also somewhat limit it.
C.

WAIVER OF DIVIDENDS

Generally, a shareholder who waives her right to receive a dividend should not be in constructive receipt of the dividend and,
therefore, should not be required to include the dividend she could
have received in her gross income. Having said that, however, the
authorities do not establish a great deal of comfort for tax advisors.
In Revenue Ruling 71-164, 31 a bank director owned a minimal number
of shares of the bank's stock, as federal law required, with the
remaining shares being held by the bank's parent. He purchased his
stock from the parent and, as part of that contract of sale, agreed to
waive dividends in excess of 50 cents/share. The ruling summarily
held that the excessive amount of the dividend was not to be included
in the director's gross income. Although the facts of the ruling may
not seem to be that common, the ruling nevertheless suggests that
when an assignment is made at arms' length, the assignment will be
respected.
This also was true in Revenue Ruling 65-256,32 where a majority
shareholder surrendered some of his rights. Here, stock of one class
could receive dividends only if equal dividends were paid on the other
class of stock. Dividends paid on the latter class also had to be paid
on the first class, but only up to 10 cents/share. The latter class of
stock was widely held. The taxpayer acquired the first class of stock
in a merger. The Internal Revenue Service held that the dividends in
excess of 10 cents/share that were not payable to the taxpayer's class
of stock were not gross income to him. Again, the form of the
transaction was important. The ruling also was careful to note that
the shareholder and the members of the public who owned the latter
class of stock had "no direct business or family relationship."
In Bagley v. United States,33 the taxpayer owned just under 500
of a corporation's stock. He was considered to have constructively
received dividends paid to his children and to his sister on stock they
owned due to his waiver of dividends he was entitled to receive on
his stock. While the court noted that a corporation was not required
to declare a proportionate dividend, the court cautioned that either
bestowing some economic benefit on the taxpayer or the familial
30.
31.
32.
33.

See Treas. Reg. 1.61-9(c).
1971-1 C.B. 108.
1965-2 C.B. 85.
348 F. Supp. 418 (D. Minn. 1972).
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connection merited further examination. There, the taxpayer derived
no economic benefit from the distributions because neither his children
nor his sister needed or used the dividends. However, "[i]f a majority
shareholder waives his dividend rights and the minority shareholders
are related to him, the majority shareholder will be deemed to have
received a constructive dividend. 3 4 The court's apparent suggestion
of a per se rule is inappropriate, especially for a situation as laden
with facts as a transfer to a member of a family.
The Internal Revenue Service has indicated in a revenue procedure
that it will provide guidance about issuing rulings regarding waivers
of dividends made that benefit a member of the family of the
shareholder." Among other considerations, the Service requires that
a business reason exist for the waiver and that the relatives of the
waiving shareholders receive no more than 20o of all dividends
received by nonwaiving shareholders.
D.

ASSIGNING GAIN FROM THE DISPOSITION OF STOCK

It is axiomatic that undistributed profits should enhance the value
of stock.
Example 3. If Shareholder A pays $1,000 for all of the stock
of Corporation X, and X then earns $600, A theoretically
should be able to sell her X stock for $1,600. Presumably,
$1,600 reflects the addition of the retained earnings' to the
value of the stock.
Although the profit would be taxed as ordinary income in any
other situation, the sale of the stock in which the profits are reflected
converts the ordinary income into capital gain. Sections 1221 and
1222 require that a "sale or exchange" of a capital asset-property
held as an investment, not for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of business, in order to permit the gain to be taxed in a preferential
manner, as capital gain 36-inevitably leads to capital gain.
This ambiguous approach to stock and its reflection of ordinary
income will appear below in greater detail, in the Waterman Steamship
- TSN line of cases,37 where the profits may-or may not-be drained
by the seller from the corporation prior to the sale of the stock to

34. Id. at 421.

35. See Rev. Proc. 67-14, 1967-1 C.B. 591.

36. I.R.C. § 1 (1993) (capital gain to be taxed to individuals at a maximum
rate of 28%; other income to. be taxed to individuals at a maximum rate of 39.6%).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 58-74.
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another party; the pre-sale distribution is most likely to occur when
the seller is a corporation, in order to convert capital gain from the
sale of the stock into a dividend, subject to the section 243 dividends
received deduction in the hands of the seller. In that case, the tax on
the seller is less than if it had received solely capital gain from the
sale.
In the following areas and cases, the seller is probably attempting
to shift the gain to another party. The decision has been made not to
have dividends paid by the corporation (although, as noted in earlier
portions of this section, diversion of dividends that arepaid to another
party is yet another assignment of income issue), such that the
shareholder and her successor in interest are more concerned with
who will be taxed on the profit that is about to be converted into
capital gain.
In some cases, a gift is made of stock and then the stock is
redeemed. Are the proceeds from the redemption of stock to be taxed
to the transferor or the transferee? These cases do not ask the precise
question-"who is the recipient of capital gain from the redemption
of the stock"-because the transferee inevitably is a charity, which is
exempt from tax. Nevertheless, answering the question-'"who is the
recipient of gain from the redemption of the stock"-also answers
the question when the gain is treated as capital gain. In Grove v.
Commissioner," the taxpayer contributed stock of his closely held
corporation to a charity that subsequently had the stock redeemed by
the corporation. Indeed, he did so on an annual basis. The Second
Circuit refused to tax gain from the redemption to the taxpayer
because it determined that the gift and the redemption were two
independent events. 9
In other cases, the corporation whose stock has been transferred
makes payments pursuant to liquidation, not redemption, of its stock.
Liquidation proceeds usually are taxed to the transferor, but the
transferor usually is considered to have transferred the stock after the
liquidation of the corporation was so advanced that it could not have
been halted. This redsoning was advanced in a series of appellate
cases, the most recent of which was the Sixth Circuit decision of
38. 490 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1973).
39. Accord Rev. Rul. 78-197, 78-1 C.B. 83 (income taxed to charity, unless
"donee is legally bound, or can be compelled by the corporation, to surrender the
shares for redemption"). But see Blake v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1982)
(donation of stock by taxpayer to charity made with understanding that charity would
have stock redeemed and use proceeds from redemption to buy property from
taxpayer; held, proceeds taxed to taxpayer).
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Jones v. United States.4° There, the taxpayer donated stock to a
charity after the corporation, of whose stock she owned 10%70, had
adopted a plan of liquidation. The taxpayer's argument notwithstanding, the court reasoned that the liquidation could not, or would not,
have been abandoned. There was no practical difference between the
taxpayer having received the liquidation distribution and donating it
to the charity or what she actually did, which was to assign the right
to receive the liquidation distribution to the charity. Therefore, the
taxpayer was taxed on the liquidation proceeds that had been distributed to the charity. 4'
If the transfer of the stock and the distribution subsequently
made on the stock are truly independent of one another, the distribution is more likely to be taxed to the shareholder who has purportedly received it. In redemptions, the two transactions generally have
been found to have greater independent significance; in liquidations,
they have not.
E.

SELLING DIVIDENDS

Although not encountered as frequently as the preceding situations, a taxpayer also might assign her interest in dividends about to
be paid. Ordinarily, if she does so for adequate consideration, the
dividends should not be taxed to her. Such a situation arose in Estate
of Stranahanv. Commissioner,42 where the taxpayer found it necessary
to raise income in order to offset an unexpected section 163 deduction
for the payment of interest. Because the Sixth Circuit found the
transaction not to have been a sham transaction and to have been
entered into for adequate consideration, it concluded that the buyer
(the taxpayer's son), not the taxpayer, was to be taxed on the dividends
43
that had been purchased.
Brundage v. United States" is somewhat inconsistent with Stranahan. There, the court bifurcated an amount paid for stock into one
portion paid with respect to the stock, for which the seller was
40. 531 F.2d 1343 (6th Cir. 1976) (good review of area).
41. Accord Dayton Hydraulic Co. v. United States, 592 F.2d 937 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979) (liquidating distributions made by corporation on
stock which its parent, the taxpayer, had distributed to its other shareholders; held,
parent taxed on liquidation proceeds distributed to its shareholders).
42. 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
43. See also Estate of Rhodes v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1942)
(per curiam) (sale of dividends to taxpayer's friend upheld; transaction conducted at
arms' length).
44. 275 F.2d 424 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 831 (1960).
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accorded capital gain treatment, and another portion, paid for accrued
dividends, for which the seller was given ordinary income treatment.
Unlike Stranahan, this payment was made in a bankruptcy proceeding
after which the corporation was to liquidate. Given the specificity
with which payments made with respect to stock could be identified,
the taxpayer's sale of his stock could be more easily associated with
the ripened right to receive dividends and proceeds from selling the
stock. Still, the validity of the contract was not questioned, such that
if one were to accept the Brundage reasoning, either all sales can be
deconstructed into elements of ordinary income and capital gain, or
Brundage simply must be held to its facts of a sale proximate to a
recently accrued dividend.
In another line of cases, payments made in the redemption of
stock have been distinguished from the right to receive dividends.
These cases stand in contrast, perhaps, to Brundage. In Estate of
Mathis v. Commissioner,45 payments made to a decedent's estate were
determined by the Tax Court to have been made in the redemption
of stock, not as dividends on stock held by the* estate. Again, the
Internal Revenue Service adopted the strongest line it could-that the
estate's right to receive dividends was so ripened that what was paid
was tantamount to a dividend-but this reasoning was not accepted
by the court. 46
Closer to Brundage is Crown v. Commissioner,47 but once again,
the Internal Revenue Service was able to rely upon a highly ripened
right to receive a dividend. In Crown, preferred stock was redeemed.
The taxpayer was unable to characterize the portion of the amount
paid to him as capital gain, however, because of the right the preferred
stock carried to receive dividends. This right was especially acute
because of its priority over dividends declared on common stock.
Because dividends had, in fact, been paid on the common stock,
payments made in redemption of the preferred stock were attributable
4
in part to the dividends that had accrued on the preferred stock. 1
In conclusion, it would appear that if a shareholder has sold her
right to receive dividends in an arms' length transaction, the dividends
45. 47 T.C. 248 (1966) (acq.).
46. Compare Rev. Rul. 69-130, 1969-1 C.B. 93 (dividend declared prior to call
for redemption of preferred stock treated as dividend, not as payment in redemption
of the stock) with Rev. Rul. 69-131, 1969-1 C.B. 94 (payment made on preferred
stock treated as redemption).
47. Crown v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 825 (1972), aff'd mem., 487 F.2d 1404
(7th Cir. 1973).
48. Accord Victor E. Gidwitz Family Trust v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 664
(1974) (following Crown); Rev. Rul. 75-320, 1975-2 C.B. 105 (same).
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are likely to be taxed to the buyer. However, if the right to receive
the dividends is too "ripened," the dividends might be taxed to the
seller.
III.

WHAT TYPE OF INCOME? - ORDINARY INCOME V. CAPITAL GAIN

Persons requiring income derived from their business can be
expected to draw down all of their business profits. Should wealthier
entrepreneurs, who don't need these distributions, choose to let their
profits remain in the business? It depends on a variety of factors.
Nontax questions must be addressed, such as whether earnings should
be reinvested in the business. Tax questions also must be analyzed,
such as whether the business' retention of earnings, for tax purposes,
makes any difference.
In some businesses, profits are taxed whether or not they are
drawn out by the owners. Partnerships and "S" corporations are the
two most obvious examples. If a business's profits are taxed to the
owners, regardless of whether distributions have been made to them,
then asking whether profits should be retained becomes an academic
question. 49 "C" corporations present another possibility. The difference in the maximum tax rates imposed on corporations and their
shareholders inevitably makes use or avoidance of "C" corporations
preferable. Whether "C" corporations should be used depends upon
which rate is higher. Even if a "C" corporation should not be used,
at least for tax purposes, it may be possible to continue to use one as
long as deductible payments can be made to the shareholders. These
payments reduce the corporation's taxable income and thus reduce
the amount subject to the corporate tax. Such payments are discussed
further below. 50
Example 4. Assume that a maximum tax rate of 40076 is
imposed on Individual A, while a maximum tax rate of only
30% is imposed on "C" corporations, including the one she
owns, Corporation X. Less tax will be imposed on A and X
if X retains its earnings. If A's business has $100 of income,
the total tax will be $30 if A runs the business through X and
does not have it distribute its profits to her and $40 if she
does business without the corporation.
49. See I.R.C. §§ 701-761 (1993) (taxation of partnerships); I.R.C. §§ 13611379 (1993) (taxation of "S" corporations).

50. See supra text accompanying Example 1; infra text accompanying notes 75-
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This conclusion is supported by the following table.
"C" corporation
proprietorship
$100
$100
business profits
30
0
-corporate tax
70
100
after-tax profits
-

individual tax

40

28

42
60
after-tax profits
If A can afford for X to retain its earnings, it should do so
because that tax is only $30, not $40. The "second tax" of $28 is not
imposed upon a distribution to A, because she never receives a
distribution.
Alternatively, if the maximum tax rate is lower for individuals
than it is for "C" corporations, a corporation whose shareholders
are individuals should never retain its profits. Assume that Individual
B owns a "C" corporation, Corporation Y, and that the maximum
tax rate imposed on individuals is 20% and the maximum tax rate
imposed on corporations is 30%. If B's business has $100 of income,
the total tax will be $30 if B runs the business through Y and does
not have it distribute its profits to her and $20 if-she does business
without the corporation.
This conclusion is supported by the following table.
"C" corporation
proprietorship
$100
$100
business profits
30
0
-corporate tax
70
100
after-tax profits
14
20
tax
-individual
56
80
after-tax profits
Before 1987, the maximum individual rate (50%) exceeded the
maximum "C" corporation rate (46%), so that there was a benefit
to retaining profits in a "C" corporation." From 1987 through 1992,
however, the maximum individual rate was lower than the corporate
51. I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (before amendment in 1986). The 1986 figures would be
displayed in table form as follows.
"C" corporation
proprietorship
$100
$100
business profits
46
0
-§ 11 corporate tax
54
100
after-tax profits
27
50
-§ 1 individual tax
27
50
after-tax profits
Were profits retained by the corporation, the business would have $54, $4 more
than the $50 available if the business operated as a proprietorship.
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rate, so that no benefit to a corporation's retention of profits re-

mained.12 Since 1993, however, the maximum individual rate (39.6%)
again exceeded the maximum "C" corporation rate (35070), so that
the corporation's retention of its profits again made sense."
Another aspect of the taxation of "C" corporations involves the
contrast between ordinary income and capital gain. An individual
who is a shareholder and who is entitled to receive a distribution from
a corporation would prefer that the distribution be treated as capital
gain, not ordinary income.
Currently, section 1(h) provides that the maximum tax on an
individual's capital gain is 28% and section 1(a)-(d) provides that the
maximum tax on an individual's ordinary income is 39.6%. The
11.607o spread was much greater before 1987, when the maximum
rates were, respectively, 200054 and 50%. 55

Thus, the taxation of corporate distributions must be played

against the background of individual shareholders' desire to convert
52. I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (after amendment in 1986 and before 1993 amendment).
These figures would be revealed in the tables as follows.
proprietorship
"C" corporation
business profits
$100
$100
-§ 11 corporate tax
0
34
after-tax profits
100
66
-§ 1 individual tax
31
20
after-tax profits
69
46
Even if the corporation were to retain its after-tax profits of $66, this would
never have been more attractive-solely for purposes of determining after-tax profitthan doing business in some other form, because any other form of business would
have led to a $69 after-tax profit. See generally Peter L. Faber, Capital Gains v.
Dividends in Corporate Transactions: Is the Battle Still Worth Fighting?, 64 TAXEs
865 (1986) (summarizing 1986 changes and their effects).
A "C" corporation could have attempted to make deductible payments to its
shareholders instead of paying dividends. This step would have reduced the income
subject to the § 11 tax and increased the income subject to the lower § 1 tax.
53. I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (1993). These figures would be revealed in the following
tables.
proprietorship
"C" corporation
business profits
$100
$100
-§ 11 corporate tax
0
35
after-tax profits
100
65
-§ 1 individual tax
40
26
after-tax profits
60
39
Were profits retained by the corporation, the business would have $65, $5 more
than the $60 available if the business operated as a proprietorship.
54. I.R.C. §§ 1, 1202 (before repeal).
55. I.R.C. § 1 (1993).
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ordinary income into capital gain. Ordinary income arises in distributions treated as dividends. In contrast, capital gain occurs when,
as under the more general capital gain provisions in the Code, the
shareholder sells a capital asset. In corporate tax, those situations
might include a redemption, where the shareholder is selling all or
some portion of her interest in the business back to it, or nonrecognition exchanges in which the shareholder has also received some
securities
"boot"-money or other property in addition to the stock5or
6
loss.
or
gain
recognizing
without
she is entitled to receive
Because corporations are entitled under section 243 to deduct a
large portion of dividends received from other corporations-currently
70%-they have always strived to receive distributions that are treated
as dividends, not capital gain. The maximum tax imposed, in effect,
on a corporation's dividend received from another corporation is
13.2% (34% tax under section 11 multiplied by 30% [100% of
dividends received minus 70% deduction]), while the maximum tax
imposed on its capital gain is 34%, under section 1201. In a variation
on this theme, when subsidiaries that file consolidated returns with
their parents pay dividends to their parents, all of the dividends are
taxation. Thus, the contrast
deductible and therefore entirely avoid
7
becomes one between 0% and 34% .
The statutory devices used by the Code to distinguish distributions
of dividends from those of capital gain tend to pivot on loss of
control or disgorgement of profits at ordinary income rates. For
example, capital gain is allowed in redemptions under section 302 if
the shareholder whose stock is redeemed surrenders all or at least
some of her control. Other sections, such as section 341, compel
disgorgement of profits at ordinary income rates. Section 341 requires
the corporation to sell much of its inventory and realize ordinary
income in order to avoid its penalty (of ordinary income treatment).
Traditionally, individual shareholders have sought to have corporate distributions treated as capital gain. The tax on capital gain
has been less than the tax on ordinary income. In contrast, corporate
shareholders have tried to have distributions treated as dividends
because the section 243 deduction allowed to a corporation renders
the tax on a dividend less than the tax on capital gain.
56. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 354 (1993) (nonrecognition when shareholder of corporation engaging in reorganization exchanges of stock or securities of her corporation
for stock or securities of another corporation participating in the reorganization);
I.R.C. § 356 (1993) (gain recognized in exchange otherwise qualifying under I.R.C.
§ 354 to the extent of money or other property received in the exchange).
57. I.R.C. § 243(a)(3) (1993).
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IV.

DiSGUISED SALES - WATERMAN

STEAMSHIP

As just discussed, individual shareholders prefer that corporate
distributions not be taxed as dividends, while corporations actually
seek such treatment. The boundary of this division is denoted by
several cases. One end of the spectrum is best illuminated by Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner.58 There, a corporation wishing to expand its business offered to purchase the two subsidiaries of
the taxpayer for $3,500,000. When the taxpayer's president presented
this offer to the board of directors, he also noted management's
intent, which had preceded the offer, to have the subsidiaries declare
a dividend of $2,800,000, as well as the tax benefit to the taxpayer of
having this dividend precede the sale.
The taxpayer's basis in the subsidiaries' stock was about $700,000,
such that a $3,500,000 purchase price would have produced $2,800,000
of capital gain. In contrast, since the three corporations filed consolidated tax returns, the dividend would have been entirely exempt from
income and the subsequent sale for $700,000-the original $3,500,000
purchase price minus the $2,800,000 dividend-would have entirely
avoided taxable gain.
Driven by this reasoning, the taxpayer made a counteroffer on
this basis. Its subsidiaries declared a dividend one month after the
offer, but did so by issuing a short-term note for $2,800,000. They
lacked sufficient cash to declare an actual cash dividend. The sale was
then consummated. Immediately thereafter, the purchaser's owner
loaned $2,800,000 to the subsidiary that had issued the note in order
to permit the subsidiary to pay off its note to the taxpayer.
The taxpayer took the position that the dividend was excluded
from income and that it had no gain, as its amount realized equalled
its basis in the stock that it had sold. The Fifth Circuit decided in
favor of the government, collapsing all of the steps into one. "[TJhe
substance of the transaction was a payment [by the buyer] * . . to
[the seller] ... of $3,500,000 for the stock of the subsidiaries,"
regardless of when title had passed from one party to another.5 9 As
the Fifth Circuit said, "[a]s the TaxCourt correctly stated: 'The crux
of the problem here is whether the planned form of the transaction
58. 430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971). See
generally Michael B. Lang, Dividends Essentially Equivalent to Redemptions: The
Taxation of Bootstrap Acquisitions, 41 TAX L. REV. 309 (1986); Charles 1. Kingson,
The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions, 85 YALE L.J. 861 (1976).
59. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185, 1191 (5th
Cir. 1970).
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had sufficient substance so that it should be recognized for tax
purposes.' 60 Unlike the Tax Court, which decided in the taxpayer's
favor, the Fifth Circuit
agree[d] with the Commissioner. The so-called dividend and
sale were one transaction. The note was but one transitory
step in a total, pre-arranged plan to sell the stock. We hold
that in substance [the subsidiary] . . . neither declared nor
paid a dividend to [the taxpayer] . . ., but rather acted as a
mere conduit for the payment of the purchase price to [the

taxpayer] ....

61

Critical to the Fifth Circuit was the fact that the "dividend"
drew the subsidiaries' profits, but not their assets. The distribution
also was financed by the purchaser. The court also rejected the
taxpayer's argument that the form of the transaction had been driven
by regulatory compulsion. "The only party that required the transaction to be cast as it was" was the taxpayer. 62 Because the taxpayer
called the shots, it was deemed to have cast the transaction in its
favor in order to avoid taxes and, thus, there was no dividend.
Other cases fall into the Waterman Steamship camp. In a case
that actually preceded Waterman Steamship, Steel Improvement and
Forge Co. v. Commissioner,63 a United States corporation sold its
foreign subsidiary, subject to the condition that the subsidiary would
repay a $150,000 debt to the parent and would pay a dividend not
exceeding $180,000 to the parent as well. Were the dividend smaller,
the purchase price would be greater. Although the parties' positions
are unclear, given the court's statement of the facts, the court's
conclusion is that this situation led to the $116,000 paid as a "dividend" being treated as part of the purchase price, not as a dividend.
In Basic, Inc. v. United States,64 one corporation, the subsidiary
of another corporation, distributed its asset, the stock of yet another
subsidiary, to the parent. Immediately after this distribution, the
parent sold the stock of its two subsidiaries. The sale was the result
of the parent's long-term planning about the direction it wished to
take, planning which had started with talks of a merger with the
company that ended up buying the subsidiaries' stock. The form of
the transaction was driven by the seller with the buyer's consent.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1195.
314 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1963).
549 F.2d 740 (Ct. CI. 1977).
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Unlike Waterman Steamship, the distribution was subject to the
section 243 deduction and not entirely deductible, and the seller's
capital gain from the sale was only reduced, not eliminated. The
specious argument in Waterman Steamship that the transaction was
shaped by regulatory constraints was replaced here by the seller's
assertion that the buyer demanded that the buyer purchase the subsidiaries' stock. The court rejected this, noting that, in fact, the buyer
actually would have preferred to acquire the subsidiaries' assets.
Whatever risks the taxpayer used to suggest that the pre-sale distribution was severable from the sale, the court determined to be risks
attendant upon any sale, and not indicative of the separate character
of each transaction.
At the other end of the spectrum is TSN Liquidating Corp. v.
United States.6 In TSN, the taxpayer sold its subsidiary's stock and,
only after the purchaser's insistence, declared a dividend. Because the
buyer did not want to acquire the subsidiary's assets, a variety of
investments, it compelled the taxpayer to have its subsidiary disgorge
these investments to the taxpayer before the sale was consummated.
In contrast to Waterman Steamship,
[taxpayer] had no definite plans prior to its negotiations with
[the buyer] . . . as to how to get rid of the undesirable stock,
when it was to get rid of the undesirable stock, or even that
it would definitely get rid of the undesirable stock. Accordingly, the Court finds that the dividend in kind . . . was part
66
and parcel of the purchase agreement with . . . [the buyer].
As the court suggests, the difference between the case before it and
Waterman Steamship was
[fin summary, in Waterman [sic], the substance of the transaction, and the way in which it was originally negotiated, was
that the purchaser would pay $3,500,000 of its money to the
seller in exchange for all the stock of the two subsidiaries and
none of the assets of those subsidiaries was to be removed and
retained by the sellers. In the case before the court, the district
court found that [the buyer] . . . did not want and would not
pay for the assets of [the seller's subsidiary] . . . which were
65. 624 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1980). See generally Steve Mather, Recent Devel-

opments, TSN Liquidating Corporation, Inc. v. United States, Negotiation Focus in
Substance-Over-Form, 7 J. CoRp. L. 171 (1981).
66. TSN Liquidating Corp. v. United States, 624 F.2d 1328, 1330 (5th Cir.
1980).
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distributed to [the taxpayer] . . . and the other stockholders
of [the subsidiary] . . . . Those assets were retained by the
67
selling stockholders.
As a corporation more clearly severs the distribution from the sale,
the likelihood increases that the distribution will be treated as a
dividend.
Also at the other end of the spectrum, standing in opposition to
6
Waterman Steamship, is Litton Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner. 1
The contrast with Waterman Steamship is even more striking, given
the payment of the dividend here being evidenced by a $30,000,000
note. In Litton, the taxpayer, a widely held corporation, had its
subsidiary declare a dividend in anticipation of its desire to sell the
subsidiary. It had no buyer when the dividend was declared. The
decision to sell the subsidiary was made in July, 1972, the dividend
was declared in late August, 1972, and the taxpayer publicly declared
its desire to sell the subsidiary in early September, 1972, a transaction
that the chairman of its board of directors thought it would have no
difficulty consummating. As expected, the subsidiary was an attractive
investment and the taxpayer received a number of inquiries. When a
buyer ultimately was secured for the subsidiary, a portion of the
purchase price paid in March, 1973, was used to pay off the note that
had evidenced the dividend.
The Litton court observed the obvious parallel between Waterman
Steamship and the case before it. The difference in the timing of the
dividends, however, was critical. In the earlier case, the seller insisted
that the dividend precede the sale, but made its wishes known only
after an offer to buy had been made. In Litton, the taxpayer, in
contrast to Waterman, took steps to execute the distribution before
any offer to buy was even solicited. Nor was the Litton court swayed
by the taxpayer's intent. The taxpayer argued that the pre-sale dividend permitted it to maximize its profit by reducing the value of the
subsidiary and also secured the payment of the subsidiary's profits to
it, as opposed to some other shareholder who later may have purchased the stock.
Under these facts, where the dividend was declared 6 months
prior to the sale of [the subsidiary] . . ., where the sale was
not prearranged, and since [the subsidiary] . . . had earnings
and profits exceeding $30,000,000 at the time the dividend was
67. Id. at 1334.
68. 89 T.C. 1086 (1987) (acq. in result in part).
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declared, we cannot conclude that the distribution was merely
a device designed to give the appearance of a dividend to a
part of the sales proceeds. In this case the form and substance
of the transaction coincide; it was not a transaction entered
into solely for tax reasons, and it should be recognized as
structured by [the taxpayer] .... 69
Other cases deserve mention as well. In a reversal of the traditional roles, the taxpayer in Casner v. Commissioner,0 was able to
establish that the payment made to him was part of the selling price.
Here, the taxpayer was an individual who retired from his business..
Although he was paid from the corporation's surplus, the payment
was part of that for which the buyer had paid, and so (1) the buyer's
receipt of this payment, which he subsequently paid to the seller, was
a dividend to the buyer and (2) the seller's receipt of this payment
from the buyer was capital gain, not ordinary income. The Internal
Revenue Service refused to follow Casner in Revenue Ruling 75-493.71
What these two authorities suggest, perhaps, is the neutrality of the
Waterman Steamship - TSN line of cases. They cannot be judged on
who might "win," because taxpayers and the Service can both benefit
from a determination that a payment is a dividend or is gain from
the sale of stock; instead, the more important question is the nature
of the payment.
In Joseph L. O'Brien Co. v. Commissioner,7 2 a dividend preceded
an SEC "no action" letter, a letter upon which the sale of the stock
with respect to which the dividend was paid was premised. This
condition to the sale was too important to permit the court to conclude
that ownership of stock had passed to the purchaser when the dividend
was paid. Thus, the buyer was not permitted to deduct the dividend
under section 243, even though the seller turned the dividends it had
received over to the buyer. 73 In Reitz v. Commissioner,7 4 a corporation
69. Litton Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1086, 1100 (1987).
70. 450 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1971).
71. 1975-2 C.B. 108-09.
72. 301 F.2d 813 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 820 (1962).
73. In cases slightly further afield, compare Walker v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d
419 (9th Cir. 1976) (stock sold subject to being held in voting trust and subject to
transferor's repurchase; held, dividends paid on stock taxable to seller, despite buyer's
control of corporation, because of seller's ownership of stock at time of dividend
payment) with DeGuire v. Higgins, 159 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
858 (1947) (dividends used to finance purchase of stock, although such use somewhat
determined by buyer's exercise of option; held, dividends taxed to buyer).
74. 61 T.C. 443 (1974), aff'd mem., 507 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1975).
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declared a distribution to its shareholders shortly before they gave the
stock away; the gift also preceded the corporation's dissolution by
four months. The taxpayer, an individual, tried to avoid characterizing
the initial distribution as a dividend. It was unable to convince the
court, however, that the distribution was somehow associated with
the "purchase" of the stock (or otherwise associated with a transaction that would generate capital gain), such that the taxpayer was
compelled to treat the distribution as a dividend.
Corporate shareholders are best able to characterize a pre-sale
dividend as a dividend when the buyer has demanded that the distribution precede the sale. One common reason for such distributions
might be that buyer does not want assets, which the corporation then
disposes of by distributing then to its parent.
V.

CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS

Constructive dividends are payments a corporation makes to
shareholders but casts as something other than a dividend. Corporations may often attempt to disguise the distribution of their earnings
and profits. Not surprisingly, these distributions result from shareholders who wish to receive distributions or other economic benefits
from their corporation, while securing some other advantage in the
process, such as enabling the corporation to deduct the expense under
section 162, as a business expense, or section 163, as interest paid on
a loan. If the corporation has sufficient earnings and profits such
that the distribution, had it actually been made, would have been a
dividend, then this disguised or "constructive" dividend should be no
less of a dividend than it would have been had it actually been made.75
Regardless of the relative tax rates imposed on those shareholders
who are individuals and on those shareholders who are corporations,
avoiding dividend status saves taxes. The most obvious way for an
entrepreneur to avoid receiving dividends is not to do business as a
"C" corporation. For example, assume that the maximum corporate
tax rate-40%-is higher than the maximum individual rate-30 0.76

75. See generally Benjamin G. Wells, RRA '90 Increases Constructive Dividend
Risk on Preferred Stock, 74 J. TAX'N 268 (1991) (treats unreasonable redemption
premiums as constructive dividends); Charles E. Small and J. Howard Sturman,
Comment, Disguised Dividends: A Comprehensive Survey, 3 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 207
(1956) (good, earlier, review).
76. See also text accompanying notes 50-52 supra (other discussion of relative
tax rates imposed on corporations and their shareholders).
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Compare the taxes imposed on businesses conducted inside and outside
the strictures of "C" corporations in this hypothetical tax system.
business profits
-corporate tax
after-tax profits
- individual tax
after-tax profits

proprietorship
$100
0
100
40
60

"C" corporation
$100
30
70
28
42

Even a casual glance at this table would suggest that the more
one can stray into the proprietorship column and away from the "C"
corporation column, the less the tax that will be imposed on the whole
enterprise. Avoiding the characterization of its distributions as dividends is beneficial to a corporate shareholder because the more it is
able to substitute deductible payments for the dividends, the more the
tax burden will resemble the proprietorship column.
Even if the individual rate is less than the corporate rate, e.g.,
rates of 20076 and 3007o respectively, rendering the distributions into
deductible payments still lessens the tax burden. Again, a table
illustrates the consequences of this hypothetical tax system.
business profits
-corporate tax
after-tax profits
-individual tax
after-tax profits

proprietorship
$100
0
100
20
80

"C" corporation
$100
30
70
14
56

Treating the distributions to the shareholders as salary or as rent
or interest payments, to name three types of deductible payments,
draws the participants and their tax burdens from the "C" corporation column to the proprietorship column. Therefore, the flip in the
relative rates that occurred in 1986 did not diminish the overall
attraction of corporations making deductible payments, nor the Service's response that constructive dividends have been paid, and the
77
subsequent flop back in 1993 did not diminish the same attraction.
Thus, the sin of doing business as a "C" corporation is not that
its shareholders share in their corporation's profits, but that they do
so through the receipt of dividends. If the profits could be passed out
to shareholders, especially as deductible payments such as salary or
rent on property leased by a shareholder (deductible under section
77. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
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162) or interest on a loan from the shareholder (deductible under
section 163), then the tax "picture" resembles the proprietorship more
and the "C" corporation less.
Certain features mark constructive dividends. Regulation section
1.301-1(c) provides that section 301 "is not applicable to an amount
paid by a corporation to a shareholder unless the amount is paid to
the shareholder in his capacity as such." The obverse of this statement-that payments made to a shareholder in her "capacity as such"
are subject to section 301 -is set forth in Regulation section 1.162-8,
which provides that "excessive . . . [compensatory] payments will be
treated as a dividend," and Regulation section 1.162-7, which underscores section 162(a)(1)'s dictate that a deduction is allowed for
business expenses such as compensation only if they are "reasonable"
expenses. While the section 162 regulations address only one subterfuge for dividends, they reveal, along with Regulation section 1.3011(c), the impossibility of simultaneously characterizing corporate payments in two ways. Either a payment, for example, is reasonable
compensation and therefore deductible, or it is unreasonable, not
deductible, and is a dividend. In other words, in the area of compensation, for example, it is not that the corporation has not paid a
salary to an employee/shareholder, it is that the compensation is
unreasonable and excessive and is so much more like a distribution
made to a shareholder with respect to her stock that it will be treated
as such adistribution, as a dividend. If it is a dividend, it necessarily
is not deductible compensation, even though it may bear compensatory
elements."7
As just noted, the Internal Revenue Service can be expected to
argue most strenuously that a constructive dividend has been paid
when there is a tax benefit, usually a deduction to the corporation,
attributable to the particular form of the payment. Payment ordinarily
is made to an owner of the business or, perhaps, to one of the owner's
relatives. As the above tables reveal, it is not the amount of the
payment that differs when the Service asserts that a constructive
78. Cf. Honigman v. Commissioner, 466 F.2d 69, 73 (6th Cir. 1972) (sale at
less than fair market value of real estate by closely owned corporation owned by
several families, none of whom had controlling interest, to one of its shareholders;
"If a distribution meets the requirements of the statutory definition of a dividend,
then it is regarded as such notwithstanding the fact that it was intended to be a
payment of some other kind." (citation omitted)).
It is possible, however, that a payment can be bifurcated. For example, some

portion of a payment may be reasonable compensation for the shareholder/employee's
services. The excessive amount, however, would be treated as a dividend. For example,

this was the tack taken by the Internal Revenue Service, albeit unsuccessfully, in
Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1949).
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dividend has been paid, it is the character of the payment. Were the

amount to diminish because, e.g., someone other than the corporation's shareholders is the recipient of the deductible payment, then
there is no tax benefit to making the deductible payment. Constructive
dividends are inevitably paid by closely held corporations, often to

shareholders who are individuals. While not all abuses lead to constructive dividends-indeed, there must be some shareholder benefit

or goal to transform mere shareholder use of corporate property or
benefit into a constructive dividend 79-the intimate nature of closely

held corporations tends to lead to frequent characterization of the

shareholder use or benefit as a constructive dividend.
Inevitably, too, a corporation must engage in formal acts in order

to evade treating a payment as a dividend. A corporation does not
absent-mindedly pay compensation or rent to a shareholder. The

corporation leaves a paper trail, for example, justifying its section
162 deduction for salary or rent. Formality is no guarantee, however,

of a favorable tax result. Thus, for example, compensation paid when

a profitable corporation has a dismal80history of paying dividends may

be recast as a constructive dividend.
As previously stated, constructive dividends are payments a corporation makes to shareholders but casts as something other than a

79. See, e.g., Loftin & Woodard, Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1206, 1215-

17 (5th Cir. 1978) (not all transfers to shareholders treated as constructive dividends).
For examples of constructive dividends, allegedly paid to a corporate shareholder,
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1990) (no constructive
dividend); Alterman Foods, Inc. v. United States, 611 F.2d 866 (Ct. Cl. 1979)
(constructive dividend); Rev. Rul. 78-83, 1978-1 C.B. 79 (same).
80. See text accompanying notes 81-98 infra; Honigman v. Commissioner, 466
F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1972) (sale at below market value treated in part as dividend);
Lengsfield v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1957) (corporation's characterization of payments to shareholders, their relatives, and employees involved with
closely held corporation as compensation not determinative in court's recasting
payments as dividends); Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153
F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946) (formal act not necessary to create constructive dividend,
nor need comparable distributions be made to all shareholders).
One such formal act might be to require the payee to return amounts which the
corporation is unable to deduct. As long as the payment is made pursuant to a
contract requiring such repayment, the payee should be entitled to deduct the
reimbursement. See, e.g., Pahl v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 286 (1976) (sole shareholder
entitled to deduct payments that reimbursed corporation for disallowed business
deduction to extent attributable to periods after reimbursement agreement was
executed); Oswald v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 645 (1968) (acq.) (lead case; all payments
deductible by payor because corporation/payee had required such reimbursement
through bylaws adopted upon incorporation).
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dividend. Usually, the shareholder is an individual and, usually, the
payment carries a tax benefit, such as a deduction for compensation,
interest, or rent, paid to the shareholder.
Courts have been reluctant to generalize about constructive dividends and, instead, appear to have approached the area on a more
discrete basis. Constructive dividend distributions are likely to recur
in one of seven situations: unreasonable compensation; excessive
payments to shareholders; bargain purchases, leases, or uses of corporate property; payments in behalf of a shareholder; unlawful shareholder diversions of corporate funds; corporate loans to shareholders;
and payments among commonly controlled corporations.
A.

UNREASONABLE COMPENSATION

Constructive dividends are commonly encountered when corporations make excessive payments to employees who also are shareholders or to members of their families. Compensation is ordinarily
deductible by the employer under section 162(a), providing that it is
ordinary, necessary, and reasonable. Not surprisingly, this is a highly
factual area. In one of the most thorough statements of indicia of
unreasonable compensation, the Sixth Circuit set forth its view in
Mayson Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner8 that:
Although every case of this kind must stand upon its own
facts and circumstances, it is well settled that several basic
factors should be considered by the Court in reaching its
decision in any particular case. Such factors include the employee's qualifications; the nature, extent and scope of the
employee's work; the size and complexities of the business; a
comparison of salariespaid with the gross income and the net
income; the prevailing general economic conditions; comparison of salarieswith distributionsto stockholders; the prevailing
rates of compensation for comparablepositions in comparable
concerns; the salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees;
and in the case of small corporations with a limited number
of officers the amount of compensation paid to the particular
employee in previous years. The action of the Board of
Directors of a corporation in voting salaries for any given
period is entitled to the presumption that such salaries are
reasonable and proper .... The situation must be considered
2
as a whole with no single factor decisive.8
81. 178 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1949).
82. Id. at 119 (emphasis added) (compensation paid to each of three officers

1993:133]

CORPORATE AND SHAREHOLDER INCOME

One frequently encountered criterion of whether compensation is
reasonable is if the employee performed services that merited the
compensation. Not surprisingly, long hours put into honest labor
more easily sustains a section 162 deduction than does featherbedding.
A lengthy record, for example, is developed in Jones Brothers Bakery,
Inc. v. United States, 3 and because that record did not reveal work
commensurate with salary, a portion of the corporation's deduction
for compensation was disallowed. Contingent compensation, such as
salary based on a percentage of sales, also is suspect. While Regulation
section 1.167-(b)(2) states that "any form of contingent compensation
invites scrutiny . . ., it does not follow that payments on a contingent
basis are to be treated fundamentally on any basis different from that
applying to compensation at a flat rate." Nevertheless, the fact that
contingent compensation was awarded to a sole shareholder led to
the Eight Circuit's disallowance of a section 162 deduction "since the
incentive of the bonus would presumably not be needed to call forth
'8
the stockholder's best efforts.

4

was reasonable; they "were experienced, highly qualified and able executives"). For
a more recent and very thorough review of the area, see Owensby & Kritikos, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1315, 1323 (5th Cir. 1987).
83. 411 F.2d 1282 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (per curiam).
84. Charles Schneider & Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 148, 153 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975) (contingent compensation). See Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 528 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1975) (controlling shareholder;
no incentive to justify bonus); see also Charles E. Smith & Sons Co. v. Commissioner,
184 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1950) (per curiam), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1951)
(percentage of sales; deduction disallowed). But see Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner,
716 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983) (sole shareholder; court entertained possibility that
bonuses could be reasonable).
The Second World War worked both for and against taxpayers. The deduction
was disallowed in Smith, in part because
The profits of the taxable years arose entirely from war contracts. While
petitioner ...secured the contracts, the market for the work was created
not by him, as was the situation in ... [citation omitted], but by the

exigencies of the war effort. The work was not technical and was relatively
simple, involving ordinary processes of cutting cloth, sewing it together, and
attaching flotation tubes in accordance with specifications and blue prints
furnished by the Government. While petitioner worked long hours and
faithfully, the increase in his compensation of nearly 1,0000o for the year
ending July 31, 1942, and over 1,700% for the year ending July 31, 1943,
was not reasonable.
184 F.2d at 1013.
In contrast, in Baltimore Dairy Lunch, Inc. v. United States, 231 F.2d 870 (8th
Cir. 1956), the long hours the employee put in during the war as competent help
entered the armed forces sustained the corporation's § 162 deduction for compensation.
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In one variation of services not being commensurate with compensation, the "compensation" may be paid to an employee's relative.
For example, in Hardin v. United States,85 a corporation made two
isolated payments to the widow of the shareholder's brother. The
decedent had been an employee of the company, but had died several
years before the payments were made. The corporation sought to
deduct the payments as compensation for the decedent's several years
of continued service to the corporation. The court, however, disallowed the deduction, characterizing the payment instead as a constructive dividend to the corporation's sole shareholder. It reasoned that
the timing of the payments, the sporadic character of the payments,
86
and the family relationships weakened the taxpayer's argument.
It stands to reason that a corporation wishing to make deductible
payments would attempt to pay solely compensation, for example,
and to refrain from paying any dividends, because the latter payments
are not deductible. Thus, cases frequently take a dismal view of
corporations trying to deduct salaries when they have paid few
dividends. On the other hand, business needs may dictate a corporation's retention of its earnings; many corporations engage in this
practice. 7 Nevertheless, in Charles McCandless Tile Service v. United

States,88 a father and son each owned fifty percent of the taxpayer,
which was engaged in the business of ceramic tile contracting. The

court conceded, even emphasized, the shareholders' contribution to

the corporation. 9 Still, the corporation's failure to pay any dividends

85. 461 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1972).
86. But see Rubber Assoc., Inc. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 75, 81 (6th Cir.
1964) (distributions made to two widows of former employees were deductible;
payments paid pursuant to preexisting written agreement and as a part of the
employees' agreed upon compensation for serving as officers of the corporation).
87. See Elliotts, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1244, which stated:
[it] may well be in the best interests of the corporation to retain and reinvest
its earnings. As the Supreme Court has noted, "Directors of a closely held,
small corporation must bear in mind the relatively limited access of such an

enterprise to capital markets. This may require a more conservative policy
with respect to dividends than would be expected of an established corporation with securities listed on national exchanges."
Id. (citation omitted)
88. 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970). See generally Michael Q. Eagan, Note,
Reasonable Compensation and the Close Corporation: McCandless, the Automatic
Dividend Rule, and the Dual Level Test, 26 STAN. L. REv. 441 (1974).
89. The court stated:
There can be little doubt on the record here that plaintiff's impressive net
profit showing during the years in question has been due in large measure
to the long experience, outstanding executive abilities, and hard work of
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during its operations until subjected to scrutiny from the Internal
Revenue Service (a period of five years), as well as paying salaries in

proportion to the stock ownership, led the court to conclude that a
portion of the salaries were constructive dividends.9 The Internal
Revenue Service also regards the history of paying dividends as an
important factor, as it suggested in Revenue Ruling 79-8. 91 The ruling

noted two circuit decisions which had "declined to adopt an automatic
dividend rule,"-i.e., that failure for a corporation to have paid any
dividends necessarily requires treating compensation paid by the corporation as a dividend-and went on to hold that

The failure of a closely held corporation to pay more than an
insubstantial portion of its earnings as dividends on its stock
is a very significant factor to be taken into account in determining the deductibility of compensation paid by the corporation to its shareholder-employees. Conversely, where after

an examination of all of the facts and circumstances (including
the corporation's dividend history) compensation paid to
shareholder-employees is found to be reasonable in amount
and paid for services rendered, deductions for such compensation under section 162(a) of the Code will not be denied on
the sole ground that the corporation has not paid more than
an insubstantial portion of its earnings as dividends on its
outstanding stock. 92
Other cases tend to sustain this approach. Many cases in which
dividends were discerned also are situations in which dividends had
never been paid since the corporation's inception. 93 Still, as even the
*

.

. [the father and the son]. The evidence is persuasive, moreover, that it

would be extremely difficult for plaintiff to replace these two officers within
any reasonable period of time. In short, the McCandlesses have played a
critical role in, and are largely responsible for, plaintiff's extremely successful
operations.
Id. at 1339.
90. McCandless, 422 F.2d at 1340. The court actually reasoned that a 150
return on equity was reasonable, such that 15% of net profits were treated as
dividends and therefore disallowed as a deduction to the corporation. Id. at 1340. A
return on equity approach was also used in Elliotts, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1247.
91. Rev. Rul. 79-8, 1979-1 C.B. 92.
92. The two circuit decisions are Charles Schneider & Co. v. Commissioner,
500 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975), and Edwin's, Inc. v.
U.S., 501 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1974). Since the ruling's promulgation, the Ninth Circuit
also has rejected the automatic dividend rule, in Elliotts, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1248-49.
93. See, e.g., Miles-Conely Co. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir.
1949) (no dividends paid over 21 year existence of corporation).
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ruling suggests, failure to pay a dividend is not fatal. 94

There is safety in numbers and, not surprisingly, a taxpayer
whose compensation to its employee/shareholders more strongly resembles what others in the industry are paying similarly situated
employees can more easily sustain a deduction for reasonable compensation. 95 Having made this statement, however, a review of the
cases suggests that the cases fall short of establishing a per se rule.
Often, either such normative evidence is rejected 96 or proof of what
others in the industry are paid is established by the taxpayer's or
government's expert witnesses, who have an interest in having their
testimony sway the trier of fact. 97
At various times, the lack of arms' length dealings raised by
corporations paying compensation to employees who are one of their
shareholders also has been noted. For example, Regulation section

1.162-7(b)(3) questions, but clearly does not find fatal, contingent

compensation if it is "not influenced by any consideration on the

part of the employer other than that of securing on fair and advantageous terms the services of the individual." To question whether
compensation has been struck at less than arms' length begs the
question, because all closely held corporations are initially suspect.
Further inquiry is always necessary. 9

94. See, e.g., Edwin's, Inc., 501 F.2d at 677 (employees had obviously worked
hard, but no dividends paid over 11 year existence of corporation); Laure v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1087, 1098 (1978) (acq. in result in part), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 653 F.2d 253 (6th Cir. 1981) (no dividends paid over
17 year history); Rev. Rul. 79-8, 1979-1 C.B. 92.
95. See, e.g., Elliotts, Inc., 501 F.2d at 677 (comparison made to franchisor's
other dealers' managers; deduction allowed); Charles Schneider & Co., 500 F.2d at
154 (Service introduced evidence of what others in industry were paid; deduction
disallowed); Jones Bros. Bakery, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.2d 1282 (Ct. Cl. 1969)
(per curiam) (taxpayer failed to establish comparable salaries; deduction disallowed);
Miles-Conely Co. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d at 960 (same); cf. Charles McCandless
Tile Service v. United States, 422 F.2d 1336, 1339 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (evidence of
comparable salaries in industry, but such evidence not helpful).
96. See, e.g., Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 528 F.2d 176, 179
(10th Cir. 1975) (comparison to industry, but deduction disallowed).
97. Compare Robert Louis Stevenson Apartments, Inc. v. Commissioner, 337
F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1964) (government failed to rebut taxpayer's expert with, e.g.,
evidence of comparable salaries in the industry; deduction allowed) with Standard
Asbestos Mfg. & Insulating Co. v. Commissioner, 276 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 826 (1960) (each party produced testimony of an executive from a
competitor of taxpayer; deduction disallowed) and Nowland v. Commissioner, 244
F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1957) (no evidence offered by taxpayer of comparable salaries
elsewhere in industry; deduction disallowed).
98. See Elliotts, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1241 (arms' length dealing questioned, but
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EXCESSIVE CORPORATE PAYMENTS MADE TO SHAREHOLDERS

As with unreasonable compensation, corporations often make
unmerited payments to shareholders in the hope of deducting a
payment that otherwise will be characterized as a constructive dividend. As with compensation matters, these tend to be highly factual
determinations. The high point, perhaps, of the circumstances upon
which such determinations depend was illustrated by the two decisions
in Tulia Feedlot, Inc. v. United States. 99 Both cases involved a fee
the corporation paid its shareholders equal to a percentage of the
loans they guaranteed in behalf of the corporation. The corporation
deducted the payment as a section 162 business expense but, in the
first decision, with respect to earlier years of the corporation, the
Fifth Circuit disallowed the deduction and determined that the shareholders had been paid constructive dividends. ,00 In the second decision,
however, made with respect to later years, the Claims Court held that
the payments to the shareholders were deductible and, therefore, not
constructive dividends.' 0'
Some of the cases have involved excessive rents or royalties.
Along the lines of the unreasonable compensation cases, courts have
simply reasoned that the amount paid was in excess of what was
reasonable. 0 2 An excessive section 162 deduction has not always been
the sought-after benefit. There are also a few cases in which the
taxpayer sought to be taxed on capital gain. In these cases, however,
the courts have characterized the payment made to the shareholders
deduction allowed); Charles Schneider & Co., 500 F.2d at 148 (Reg. § 1.162-7 quoted
in text noted; deduction disallowed); Charles McCandless Tile Serv., 422 F.2d at
1336 (Reg. § 1.162-7 quoted in text noted).
99. 513 F.2d 800 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 927 (1975).
100. Id. Accord Olton Feed Yard, °Inc. v. United States, 592 F.2d 272 (5th Cir.
1979). See generally Marc W. Degler, Comment, Fee Paymentsfor Shareholder Debt
in the Close Corporation Setting: Has the Internal Revenue Service Improperly
Departed From Established Statutory and Judicial Doctrine?, 7 VA. TAX REv. 157
(1987); Steven B. Fabrizio, Note, Shareholder-GuarantorFees: Deductible Business
Expenses or Dividends?, 40 TAX LAW. 905 (1987).
101. 3 Ct. Cl. 364, 52 A.F.T.R.2d 5702 (Cl. Ct. 1983).
102. See, e.g., Potter Elec. Signal & Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 200
(8th Cir. 1961) (lease of property from sole common and majority preferred shareholder); W. H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951) (sale
and leaseback from chief shareholder, who never would have engaged in transaction
otherwise; purchase not subject to competition and cash for purchase borrowed from
bank); Ingle Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1949) (mining
corporation reorganized and royalties for mining coal unnecessarily increased); Omholt v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 541 (1973)(accq.) (royalty paid to shareholder for his
assignment of patent excessive).
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-as constructive dividends. In Goldstein v. Commissioner,13 a shareholder sold to his corporation real estate he had just purchased twentythree days earlier. He owned the corporation with his brothers, who
apparently let him do whatever he wanted. To stimulate the corporation's acquisition of real estate upon which the corporation did
business, he entered in the purchase of the property by himself,
recognizing that he might resell the property to the corporation. The
Ninth Circuit was unable to dismiss the fact that he purchased the
property for $35,000 and resold it for $75,000. Because the resale
price exceeded the property's fair market value, and because the
shareholder would have used his $40,000 short term capital gain to
offset a capital loss, the court recharacterized the gain as a constructive
dividend. Similarly, in Crabtree v. Commissioner,104 the Tax Court
regarded a shareholders' transfer of a car dealership franchise to a
corporation in exchange for half the corporation's profits over the
next ten years as being excessive; receipt of stock to which they had
transferred the stock was adequate consideration for the franchise.
Thus, the stream of profits were to be taxed as constructive dividends,
not as capital gain.
C. BARGAIN PURCHASES, LEASES, OR USES, OF CORPORATE
PROPERTY BY SHAREHOLDERS

If a corporation sells property to a shareholder, or otherwise
transfers property to her, at a discount, she has received an economic
benefit.
Example 5: Corporation X sells property worth $10,000 to its
sole shareholder, A, for $7,000. A has received a $3,000
benefit, because she has paid only $7,000 for property worth
$10,000.
Elsewhere in the tax law, such benefits are included in income. 05 The
regulations recognize the economic benefit of bargain sales to shareholders in Regulation section 1.301-1(j), which provides:
If property is transferred -by a corporation to a shareholder
which is not a corporation for an amount less than its fair
market value in a sale or exchange, such shareholder shall be
treated as having received a distribution to which section 301
applies. In such case, the amount of the distribution shall be
103. 298 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962).
104. 22 T.C. 61 (1954), aff'd mem., 221 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1955).

105. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (broad

statement regarding economic benefits included in taxpayer's income under § 61).
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the difference between the amount paid for the property and
its fair market value.
Also, the Supreme Court has stated that,
While a sale of corporate assets to stockholders is, in a literal
sense, a distribution of its property, such a transaction does
not necessarily fall within the statutory definition of a dividend. For a sale to stockholders may not result in any diminution of its net worth and in that case cannot result in any
distribution of its profits.
On the other hand, such a sale, if for substantially less
than the value of the property sold, may be as effective a
means of distributing profits among stockholders as the formal
declaration of a dividend.'°6
While the tax benefit often available to a corporation when other
constructive dividends are paid, as with the section 162 deduction for
compensation just noted, is lacking here, bargain sales nevertheless
remain attractive to shareholders of closely held corporations and are
Revenue Service and courts have
a fertile area in which the Internal
07
1
dividends.
constructive
discerned
One problem frequently surrounding bargain sales is determining
the amount of the dividend that arises when the discounted transfer
occurs. Regulation section 1.301-16) says that the "amount" is "the
difference between the amount paid for the property and its fair
market value." This principle is relatively easy to apply in straightforward sales. For example, in Epstein v. Commissioner,10 shareholders who controlled a corporation forced it to sell several parcels of
real estate at less than the properties' fair market value to trusts they
had established for the benefit of their children. The Tax Court simply
106. Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63, 69 (1937).
107. But see Baumer v. United States, 580 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1978), where a
son's purchase of an option from his father's corporation for a nominal sum was
treated as a constructive dividend to the father. The apparent tax benefit to the father
was that he would not have been required, had his tax planning been successful, to
take the benefit given to his son into his own income.
Another potential tax benefit, as illustrated by Honigman v. Commissioner, 466
F.2d 69, 73 (6th Cir. 1972), is a loss generated by the sale to the shareholder,
accompanied by the mere formal change in ownership of the property. To some
extent, however, § 267 also limits such paper losses. On § 267, see generally Robert
I. Keller, At a Loss: A Half Century of Confusion in the Tax Treatment of Transfers
of Depreciated Property Between Related Taxpayers, 44 TAX LAW. 445 (1991).
108. 53 T.C. 328 (1970) (acq.).
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held that the amount of the constructive dividend was, as the regulation suggests, the difference between the properties' fair market
value and what the trusts had paid. A less common variation occured
in the sale of mineral interests in Green v. United States.1' 9 Here, the
method used to value such interests for purposes of taking depletion
deductions-what value is established by sales of comparable'
property" 0-also was deemed reasonable in determining the amount
of the constructive dividend.
An option to buy the corporation's property also may be treated
as a constructive dividend. Determining the amount of the option,
however, has proved problematic.' It One line of cases regarding
options to buy corporate stock is actually known better in the area
of corporate reorganizations and separations because of the option
holder's attempt to mask the profit derived from receipt of the option
as unrecognized gain pursuant to section 355; this section shields gain
and loss received when one corporation distributes stock of a subsidiary to its shareholders." 2 Starting with Palmer v. Commissioner,
which contained the above quotation regarding below market value
sales being an "effective a means of distributing profits among
stockholders as the formal declaration of a dividend, ' '"

3

such distri-

butions have been examined to determine whether they result in
taxable dividends. Most recently, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the
area in Redding v. Commissioner,114 where a corporation issued
warrants to acquire the stock of its subsidiary. After dismissing section
355's applicability, the court proceeded to analyze when the warrant
holders were taxable. It held that the "taxpayers received a dividend
upon receipt of the warrants and the amount of the dividends was
the fair market value of the warrants received."" ' 5 In reaching this
conclusion, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that Palmer's rationale that
109. 460 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1972).
110. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-(d)("actual sales and transfers of similar properties").
111. Sometimes the option is expressly labelled a constructive dividend, as in
Baumer, 588 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1978), and sometimes it is merely labelled a dividend,
as in Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
913 (1983). Regardless of the description, all the option cases fall within the realm
of constructive dividends.
112. See generally DANIEL M. SCHNEIDER AND PAUL E. HOELSCHEN, JR., FEDERAL
TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS ch. 13 (1988) (discusses separations);
BORIS

I.

BITTKER AND JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS

ch. 11 (6th ed. 1994)
113. 302 U.S. 63, 69 (1937).
114. 630 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1980).
115. Id. at 1181.

AND SHAREHOLDERS

(same).

1993:133]

CORPORATE AND SHAREHOLDER INCOME

merely issuing stock rights was not a dividend was old law.)' 6 Revision
of the rules governing the taxation of dividends when the 1954 Code
was enacted, as well as Palmer's concern with stock rights purchased
at their fair market value, limited the case's continued vitality." 7 To
the Redding court, the more recent Supreme Court decision of Commissioner v. Gordon' 8 did address stock options issued to shareholders
at less than market value by limiting Palmer to its facts."19
What is less clear is when the option is to be valued and included
as income. One possibility, clung to by the Internal Revenue Service
presumably because of the earlier time of taxation, is that the option
is income when it is issued. 20 The contrary view, that the warrants
can be valued only when exercised, also is a respectable opinion, as
the Court's holding in Gordon indicates.' This latter view also was
the view of the Fifth Circuit in Baumer v. United States,2 2 in which
a sole shareholder's son paid a nominal amount to receive an option
to purchase some of the corporation's real estate. The bargain purchase was determined to be a constructive dividend to the father, and
was considered to be taxable when exercised, because that is when it
first had an ascertainable value. As the extensive analysis in Baumer
indicates, delaying the taxation of options until they are exercised is
somewhat a function of the facts of the case. In other words, the
value of the option must clearly have an ascertainable value only
when it is exercised, not when it is granted, in order to delay its
inclusion in income.
Bargain rentals-either at a low rate or not paid at all-paid by
shareholders to their closely held corporations constitute income to
the shareholders as much as below market sales. Rent the lessee
shareholder should have, but did not, pay, is income to her. A reading
of the cases reveals a flavor of business use of the leased property
being entwined, and often overwhelmed, by personal use. The taxpayer's failure of proof is prominent in these cases. For example, in
2 3

Dean v. Commissioner,

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 391 U.S. 83 (1968).
119. Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169, 1183 (7th Cir. 1980).
120. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-521, 1970-2 C.B. 72. Accord Redding, 630 F.2d at
1181.
121. Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968) (warrant valued and taxed
when it was exercised).
122. 580 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1978).
123. 187 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1951).
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The taxpayer and his wife are the sole shareholders in a
personal holding company called the Nemours Corporation.
The wife owns 80% of the stock. The real estate which is the
subject matter of this controversy was owned by the taxpayer's
wife prior to her marriage. She and the taxpayer continued to
occupy it after their marriage and the taxpayer's wife expended
and has continued to expend appreciable sums in keeping up
and beautifying the property. In 1931 the Nemours Corporation was indebted to a bank for a large sum. The bank insisted
that the residence property above mentioned be transferred to
the corporation. This was done. The parties continued to
occupy the place as a home following the transfer. 21 4
In International Artists, Ltd. v. Commissioner,125 the famous
kitsch pianist with the flamboyant suits, Liberace, had his corporation,
which was in the business of producing and promoting his tours,
build a home for personal and business use. 126 The difficulty of
separating business and personal use is revealed by the court, which
stated:
a lease was executed between petitioner and the corporation,
covering a small portion of the premises located on the third
floor of the three-story structure. Rentals were provided under
the lease in the sum of $300 per month ....
The record is
124. Id. at 1019-20.
125. 55 T.C. 94 (1971) (acq.).
126. Readers may be amused by the following determination by the Tax Court.
Petitioner's public image during his period of success in the early part
of the 1950's is described by him as one of "glamour and elegance." This
image was conveyed to the public by means of elegant costumes, and
unusual musical instruments and stage settings. It was calculated to arouse
the interest of the public and draw spectators. The emphasis, in Liberace
performances, had been as much upon the visible spectacle of his show as
upon his musical talent. Nevertheless, in 1958, at the urging of his business
manager, and prompted by his loss of popularity and reduced income,
petitioner discarded the elegant image in favor of a more conservative one.
His life style shifted from the spectacular to the conventional. However,
this change failed to improve the deteriorating financial condition of the
business and, in fact, contributed to its further decline. A second television
series initiated in 1958 was forced to close after 26 weeks because of
Liberace's diminished popularity.
In 1960, in an effort to revitalize the corporate business, the officers
of the corporation resolved to reintroduce the previously successful "elegant" image of petitioner. Their efforts in this regard met with success.
Id. at 96-97.
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replete with testimony, including that of petitioner, that petitioner's use of [the house] . . . was not limited to the leased
premises on the third floor. It is to be noted, among other
things, that this area was physically united with the balance
of the home; there existed no separate entrance or a partition
separating the two. The entire home remained at all times
accessible to petitioner. No restrictions were placed upon
petitioner's use of the house except that contained in the lease
which subjected petitioner's personal use of the entire premises
to the overriding business needs. Petitioner, in fact, regarded
the entire home as his own. His invited guests were not
restricted to the leased premises. Nor did petitioner heed
boundaries in the storage of personal effects on the property
or in the personal use of all available facilities.
The lease, upon which petitioner heavily relies, was strictly
a paper affair. Petitioner fully enjoyed the facilities of [the
house] . . ., including the many elaborately furnished rooms,
a private gymnasium, multiple-car garage, and swimming pool
situated in the formally landscaped setting of [the house's]
... grounds. The alleged valuation of the expert at best
establishes the value of the suite of rooms covered by the
lease; it must therefore be rejected. 21
Once the rental of corporate property to a shareholder has been
established, usually the income taxed to the shareholder equals the
difference between what she paid as rent and the property's fair rental
value.' 28 Such a measure of the constructive dividend is not inviolate,
however, and sometimes the "cost" of the property may be the

127. Id. at 106.
128. For a summary exposition of the Service's position, see Rev. Rul. 58-1,
1958-1 C.B. 173. See also 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d
724 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 820 (1952) (sublease by shareholder of property
leased by corporation; below rental value led to shareholder's being taxed on profits
as constructive dividend); Nicholls, North, Buse Co. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1225
(1971) (acq.) (shareholder's sons' use of company yacht; although such value conceded
not to be less than cost, i.e., depreciation and operating expenses, infra text
accompanying notes 128-130). But see Peacock v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 160 (5th
Cir. 1958) (lease of residence treated as gift; questionable decision).

As InternationalArtists and Nicholls, North reveal, a consequence of a share-

holder's personal use of corporate property is disallowance to the corporation of tax
benefits generated by the property, such as depreciation or the investment tax credit,
because the corporation is not using the leased property for business purposes.

172
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measure of the fair rental value. 129 The Fifth Circuit exhaustively
reviewed the area in 1978 in Loftin & Woodard, Inc. v. United
States, 30 where a corporation cleared land owned by its shareholders.
It concluded that cost should have applied as a measure of the
dividend "when there is no credible evidence of fair market value or
when evidence of fair market value exists but is clearly rebutted."''
D.

PAYMENTS IN BEHALF OF A SHAREHOLDER

Students of federal income taxation are undoubtedly familiar
with the seminal case that establishes that discharge of another
person's obligations constitutes income to the person whose debt has
been discharged,' 32 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner.' There,
a corporation discharged the income tax liability of its officers,
including the taxpayer's, its president. The Supreme Court held
The payment of the tax by the employers was in consideration
of the services rendered by the employee, and was again
derived by the employee from his labor. The form of the
payment is expressly declared to make no difference .... It is
therefore immaterial that the taxes were directly paid over to
the government. The discharge by a third person of an obli134
gation to him is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed.

Key to the decision is the fact that the employee was relieved of his
own obligation. Had he paid his tax liability of, e.g., $1,000, he
would have been poorer by $1,000. That the corporation paid the
$1,000 makes him $1,000 richer, and it is that $1,000 benefit that is
129. See, e.g., Challenge Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 650 (1962) (acq.)
(shareholder's use of a corporate yacht hard to value; half of expenditures corporation
made and half of depreciation taxed to shareholder as constructive dividend).
130. 577 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1978). Subsequent decisions regarding cost include
Ireland v. United States, 621 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1980) (trips in corporation's airplane),
and Melvin v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 63 (1987), aff'd on other grounds, 894 F.2d
1092 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (use of corporation's cars). Prior cases cited in
Loftin & Woodard include Commissioner v. Riss, 374 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1967)(use
of house), and Walker v. Commissioner, 362 F.2d 140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 865 (1966)(same).
131. Loftin & Woodard, 577 F.2d 1222.

132. The Supreme Court's reliance upon Old Colony Trust, over fifty years
later, in Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191 (1982), to establish that the donees'
discharge of the donors' gift tax liability is gross income to the donors -uggests the
continued importance of the case.
133. 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
134. Id. at 729 (citations omitted).
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included in his income. His employment also is influential, even if
not determinative, so that the discharge of the obligation is in the
nature of salary, which obviously would be income to the employee.
Thus, Old Colony Trust is not squarely on point with the assertion
that a corporation's payments for the benefit of its shareholder is
income to her, but it nevertheless is pertinent.
A review of the cases in the area indicates a mo're finely honed
spectrum of cases ranging from corporate purposes for payments in
behalf of a shareholder, which negates the shareholder's receipt of
income, to those with solely personal motives, which leads to the
shareholder's receipt of a constructive dividend. At the former end,
perhaps illustrating the highwater mark of corporate purposes, is
Dolese v. United States.'35 There, a shareholder's three corporations
were ordered by a judge to pay three-fourths of his divorce expenses,
and he was ordered to pay the rest. Payment of divorce expenses are
inevitably nondeductible personal expenses, 3 6 but "here a portion of
the suit is against the corporation to compel preservation of the
corporate assets, with the potential effect of increasing the wife's
property settlement under the divorce." 37
Dolese also signals the tax benefit that is frequently the stamp of
constructive dividends in this area-a section 162 deduction for the
corporation's business expenses. In a complex factual setting, the
parent corporation in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner,38 one of
whose subsidiaries insured it and others of its affiliates, was able to
avoid treating the benefit of this self-insurance program as a constructive dividend because, again, it served the legitimate business purpose
of providing insurance coverage. The premiums were not deductible,
however, because premiums for self-insurance are difficult to deduct.
Other, business-like expenses, however, have been treated as constructive dividends, including valuation payments associated with a reorganization, 3 9 employees' medical benefits,' 40 and entertainment and
135. 605 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
137. Dolese, 605 F.2d at 1151 (legal expenses in filing papers in litigation at
hand and settling other litigation, and in defending against shareholder's removal
from management deductible; appraisals associated with divorce and expenses apparently associated with proof of wife's infidelities not deductible).
138. 914 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1990).
139. Rev. Rul. 75-421, 1975-2 C.B. 108 (corporation about to be acquired paid
valuation expenses incurred by shareholder).
140. Larkin v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 629 (1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir.
1968) (expenses paid informally, not pursuant to a specific plan almost exclusively to
employees who also were shareholders).
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travel expenses.' 4' At the other extreme are cases in which a clearly
personal purpose of the shareholder was served, such that the corporation's payment of that benefit was characterized as a constructive
dividend. Such purposes have included items such as the expenses
associated with maintaining a shareholder's farm, 42 building racing
boats for a shareholder, 41 or paying a fine imposed on a shareholder.' 44 These clearly personal expenses all led to the shareholder's
receipt of a constructive dividend.

Somewhere in the middle, but no more deductible than cases in

which a shareholder's personal purpose is being served, are those

cases in which corporation has assumed an obligation of one of its
shareholders. These cases would seem to devolve directly from Old

Colony Trust's'4 5 dictate that a third party's discharge of an obligation
is income to the person relieved of the debt. Thus, a corporation's
payment on its shareholders' guarantee to pay a third party's debt, if
that party failed to make payments itself, was treated as income to

the shareholders.'

46

Some of the aforementioned cases in which a

shareholder was deemed to have income as his corporation paid his

personal expenses also stand for the more specific proposition that
income arises to the shareholder when the corporation discharges the
shareholder's obligation-his debt to a third party-by paying his

expense. 47 Associated with this view is the reasoning, for example, of
the Tax Court in Creel v. Commissioner. 48 Although the court refused

to treat interest-free loans by a corporation to its shareholder, the

taxpayer, as income to the taxpayer-an issue that was hotly contested
when Creel was decided' 49-it

nevertheless taxed the shareholder. The

141. See Ashby v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 409 (1968) (entertainment expenses
of majority shareholder); Meridian Wood Prods. Co. v. United States, 725 F.2d 1183
(9th Cir. 1984) (travel expenses of wife of officer, a 50% shareholder).
142. Greenspon v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956).
143. American Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1100 (1957), aff'd
mem., 262 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1958).
144. Sachs v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 879 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822
(1960) (court also noted that payment was not in nature of indemnification, and,
therefore, constructive dividend status could not be avoided on this basis).
145. 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
146. Tennessee Secur., Inc. v. Commissioner, 674 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1982).
147. See Meridian Wood Prods. Co. v. United States, 725 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir.
1984) (shareholder's travel expenses); Sachs, 277 F.2d 879 (fine imposed on shareholder); Ashby v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 409 (1968) (shareholder's entertainment
expenses); Larkin v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 629 (1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir.
1968) (shareholder/employees' medical expenses).
148. 72 T.C. 1173 (1979), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Martin v. Commis-

sioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981).
149. See text accompanying notes 177-188 infra. See generally

BORIS

1. BITTKER
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corporation had borrowed money, for which it paid interest, in order
to make these interest-free loans to the taxpayer. To this extent, the
court determined the corporation was acting as the shareholder's
agent, such that its payments on the interest-bearing loans were income
to the shareholder.
There is a point beyond which payments will not be considered
to have been paid on a shareholder's behalf. For example, in Enoch
v. Commissioner, 50 the taxpayer engaged in a bootstrap purchase of
a corporation from someone else; in such cases, the corporation
ordinarily redeems most of the selling shareholder's stock and the
buyer only purchases a few of the corporation's shares. This is cheaper
for the buyer than buying all of the corporation's stock. Again, the
Tax Court honored the form of a transaction, and held that the
redemption was bona fide, such that the redemption would not be
treated as a constructive dividend to the buyer. 5'
Enoch actually represents part of a larger tableau of cases.
Generally, if the corporation relieves the shareholder of her obligation
to buy stock, leading cases such as Wall v. United States and Sullivan
v. United States5 2 indicate that the shareholder has a constructive
dividend. Other cases, such as Enoch and Edenfield v. Commissioner,'53 do not impute income to the shareholder if it was the
corporation that was obligated to buy the property, not the shareholder, even if the shareholder provides additional security for the
corporation's purchase.
Form is obviously important in this area. Perhaps the best that
can be said is that shareholders avoid constructive dividend status by
leaving as clear a paper trail as possible that indicates that their
corporations, not they, are responsible for redeeming or otherwise

AND LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs

58.1

(1989) (discussing history of interest-free loans); Sharon S. Hutton, Interest-Free

Loans to Shareholders and Employees, 7 CORP. L. REV. 185 (1984).
150. 57 T.C. 781 (1972)(acq. and nonacq.).
151. It did, however, determine that the payments made to discharge the
taxpayer's loan, incurred to buy the stock, was income to the buyer. See text
accompanying notes 177-188 infra.
152. Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947) (taxpayer bought
another shareholder's stock, then caused corporation to redeem stock he was obligated
to buy; held, income to taxpayer, as if he had been paid a dividend); Sullivan v.
United States, 363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 905 (1967)
(corporation's redemption of stock shareholder was obligated to buy from corporation's employee when employee left job treated as constructive dividend to shareholder). See generally Lang, supra note 58.
153. 19 T.C. 13 (1952) (acq.) (taxpayer not obligated on corporation's second
mortgage on property).
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buying stock. That presents the strongest case for avoiding imposition
54
of a constructive dividend.
Form is less important, or at least subservient to the more vague
standard of "substance," in connection with the corporation's assumption of an entrepreneur's liabilities when she incorporates her
business. Assumption of an obligation could be treated as income to
the shareholder along the line of cases running from Old Colony
Trust through Wall to Sullivan. On the other hand, Congress indicated
its desire not to tax the incorporation of a business by enacting section
351, which generally permits the incorporator to avoid recognizing
gain in such an event. Congress has further revealed its desire not to
penalize incorporations by enacting section 357(a), which generally
treats the corporation's assumption of a shareholder's liability as a
nonrecognition event.'55 Exceptions are carved from section 357(a)
such as section 357(b), for example, where the shareholder is penalized
if the corporation assumes her liability when she incurred the debt
and had the corporation assume the liability to avoid tax. Then, the
shareholder must recognize gain when the liability is assumed. Thus,

154. See generally Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42 (presenting these principles

in a variety of circumstances). Compare Ciaio v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 447 (1967)

(acq.) (remaining shareholder bought departing shareholders' stock, but corporation
paid for it, under terms required by lender to obtain financing for acquisition; held,
transactions stepped together so that remaining shareholder mere conduit for corporation and did not receive a constructive dividend); Decker v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.
326 (1959) (acq. in result, acq. in result withdrawn, nonacq.), aff'd mem., 286 F.2d
427 (6th Cir. 1960) (under 1939 Code, decedent estate's stock purchased by remaining
shareholders then redeemed by corporation; held, purchase and redemption stepped
together so that remaining shareholders did not receive a constructive dividend); State
Pipe & Nipple Corp. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (P-H) 1354 (1983) (court refused
to impose constructive dividend upon remaining shareholder based upon strong facts
that disputed his clear obligation to purchase stock from decedent's estate) with
Schroeder v. Commissioner, 831 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1987) (shareholder bought stock
from decedent's estate, then had corporation redeem stock in order to pay off loan
used to finance purchase; form dictated by estate, but court did not step purchase
and redemption together with result that shareholder had taxable dividend); Adams
v. Commissioner, 594 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1979) (buyer purchased all of seller's stock,
then had corporation redeem some of the stock; held, purchase and redemption not
stepped together so that buyer received taxable dividend); Buchholz Mortuaries, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (P-H) 1254 (1990) (facts negated Service's assertion that
remaining shareholder was obligated to purchase stock of departing shareholders, so
that he did not have constructive dividend).
155. See generally BITTKER AND EUSTICE, supra note 111, at ch. 3 (discussing §
351 and related issues, such as § 357).
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a corporation's assumption of its shareholder's liabilities ordinarily
should not lead to a constructive dividend to the shareholder.
Section 357 notwithstanding, courts have tended to find the
corporation's assumption of shareholder debt to lead to constructive
dividends. In other words, given the choice between aligning with
section 357, which does not tax a corporation's assumption of a
shareholder's obligation, and general principles surrounding constructive dividends, which does tax such an assumption, courts have tended
to align with the latter position. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held in 1964
that a constructive dividend occurred to partners who incorporated
their business in Jewell v. United States.'5 6 It summarily affirmed this
view two years later in Wolf v. Commissioner.' 7 The Fifth Circuit
has also indicated its desire to tax incorporators in such circumstances.
Although it searched for a business reason for the corporation's
assumption of liabilities in United States v. Smith,"' the Fifth Circuit
revealed a propensity to tax the shareholder in such cases as it
remanded the case for further review. Nonetheless, the fullest exposition is afforded by Jewell, which expressly perceived a tax avoidance
purpose under section 357(c)'s predecessor to the corporation's assumption of liabilities, thereby negating the taxpayer's argument that
section 357(a)'s predecessor should apply.
Form also seems important, and redounds to the shareholder's
benefit, when a corporation makes a charitable contribution. In the
earlier of two rulings, Revenue Ruling 68-658,119 the Internal Revenue
Service reviewed two situations. In one, where the sole shareholder
directed his corporation to make a contribution to a charity, the
Service indicated that a constructive dividend would result to the
shareholder; "in reality, [the contribution] serves only the personal
objectives of ... [the corporation's] sole shareholder." In the other
situation discussed by the ruling, the Service refused to discern a
constructive dividend. There, however, the corporation was publicly
identified as the donor, not its shareholder. Thus, presumably, less
benefit inured to the shareholder's benefit, such that there was less
compulsion to tax the shareholder on a constructive dividend. The
Tax Court refused to tax a charitable contribution made by a corporation to its shareholder in Knott v. Commissioner'60 because, as the
Service later stated, "property or an economic benefit must be received
156. 330 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1964).
157. 357 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1966).
158. 418 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1969).
159. 1968-2 C.B. 119.
160. 67 T.C. 681 (1977) (acq.).
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by the controlling shareholders or their families as a result of the
corporation's charitable contribution in order for the contribution to
be treated as a constructive dividend to the shareholders.' ' 6 In this
later statement, Revenue Ruling 79-9, the Service stated that it would
follow Knott and revoked its earlier ruling on the subject, Revenue
Ruling 68-658.162
The proper form also appears to be important when considering
the consequences of insuring the life of a corporation's shareholders.
Several circuit court decisions in the late 1950s established that,
properly cast, insurance carried on the life of a shareholder would
not lead to her receiving a constructive dividend whenever a premium
is paid on the policy by the corporation. The corporation, however,
had to be the owner and beneficiary of the policy. 163 The Internal
Revenue Service quickly indicated its intent to follow this line of cases
in Revenue Ruling 59-184, 64 where it stated:
where a corporation purchases life insurance on the lives of
its stockholders, the proceeds of which are to be used in
payment for the stock of [any] stockholder, the premiums on
such insurance do not constitute income to [any] stockholder,
even though the stockholder has the right to designate a
beneficiary, provided such right of the beneficiary to receive
the proceeds is conditioned upon the transfer of the corporate
stock to the corporation. The payment of premiums by the
corporation is merely an independent act by the corporation
by which it converts one asset, cash, into another asset, an
insurance policy, and such action has no relationship whatsoever to the receipt of income by the stockholders. 65
Some cases have held insurance premiums to be constructive
dividends to the shareholders. One such case, Paramount-Richards
Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner,'66 involved a beneficiary who was the
insured shareholder's wife, not the corporation, and also involved an

161. Rev. Rul. 79-9, 1979-1 C.B. 125, 126.
162. See Rev. Rul. 68-658, 1968-2 C.B. .119.
163. See Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957); Casale v.
Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1957); Sanders v. Fox, 253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir.
1958). See generally Joseph T. Sneed, Defense of the Tax Court's Result in Prunier

and Casale, 43

CORNELL

L.Q. 339 (1958).

164. 1959-1 C.B. 65.
165. Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 602 (5th
Cir. 1946).
166. Id.
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adjustment to the price of the stock, as opposed to a garden variety
cross-purchase agreement where the corporation would use the insurance proceeds to buy the stock of the deceased shareholder.' 67 As
Revenue Ruling 59-184 indicates, however, naming the corporation as
the beneficiary and using the insurance proceeds to buy the decedent's
stock could have rectified even Paramount-Richards.
One Tax Court case, Genshaft v. Commissioner,16 decided subsequently to the above 1950s appellate decisions, treated maintenance
of an insurance policy as income to the shareholders of the corporation. The insurance carried in Genshaft was split-life insurance, which
entails the shareholder's receipt of at least some portion of the
proceeds.' 69 The Tax Court did not discuss the aforementioned line
of cases, even though it had just rendered another decision affirming
that line. 70 Thus, Genshaft would seem to be limited to split-life
insurance policies.
E.

UNLAWFUL SHAREHOLDER DIVERSIONS OF CORPORATE FUNDS

Students of federal income tax are, or should be, aware, that
embezzled funds are income to the thief. The analogy of such funds
to borrowed money, which does not increase the borrower's net worth
and, therefore, does not constitute income, was initially accepted by
the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Wilcox, 7' but subsequently
rejected by it in James v. United States. 72 Neither case, however,
dealt with embezzlement or diversion of corporate funds by a shareholder.
167. Sanders v. Fox, 253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958), is a good example of the
cross-purchase arrangement.
168. 64 T.C. 282 (1975)(acq.).
169. As stated by the court,
Under the normal 'split-dollar' arrangement, the employer and the employee
join in purchasing a whole life insurance contract (or a similar type contract
containing a substantial investment element) on the life of the employee.
The employer agrees to provide the funds to pay the portion of the premium
attributable to the annual increase in cash surrender value with the employee
paying the balance. In the event of the death of the insured the employer is
entitled to receive out of the proceeds of the policy an amount equal to the

cash surrender value, or at least a sufficient part thereof to equal the funds

it has provided for premium payments. The employee is entitled to name
the beneficiary of the balance of any such proceeds.
Id. at 284, n.2.
170. Estate of Horne v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1020 (1975).
171. 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
172. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
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Subsequent decisions have addressed the possibility that shareholder diversions of corporate funds may constitute a constructive
dividend to the shareholder. Illegal or, at the very least, gravely
questionable diversion of corporate funds for a shareholder's benefit
is only one step beyond mere diversion of corporate funds for a
shareholder's benefit, as when a corporation pays for a shareholder's
personal expenses. Arguably, the conclusion that embezzled funds are
income to the embezzler renders further discussion of such income as
constructive dividends moot. While no embezzlement-constructive
dividend cases have arisen, some cases, however, discuss the matter
in more general terms. 73
173. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Commissioner, 552 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1977), which
states:
The starting point for analysis of this case is James v. United States
which established that embezzled funds can constitute taxable income to the
embezzler. When a taxpayer acquires earnings, lawfully or unlawfully,
without the consensual recognition, express or implied, of an obligation to
repay and without restriction as to their disposition ....

[he has income].

The Commissioner contends that there can never be "consensual rec-

ognition

. .

. of an obligation to repay"

in an embezzlement case. He

reasons that because the corporation as represented by a majority of the
board of directors was unaware of the withdrawals, there cannot have been
consensual recognition of the obligation to repay at the time the taxpayer
Gilbert acquired the funds. Since the withdrawals were not authorized and
the directors refused to treat them as a loan to Gilbert, the Commissioner
concludes that Gilbert should be taxed like a thief rather than a borrower.
In a typical embezzlement, the embezzler intends at the outset to
abscond with the funds. If he repays the money during the same taxable
year, he will not be taxed.
This is not a typical embezzlement case, however, and we do not
interpret James as requiring income realization in every case of unlawful
withdrawals by a taxpayer. There are a number of facts that differentiate
this case from .

.

. James. When Gilbert withdrew the corporate funds, he

recognized his obligation to repay and intended to do so. The funds were
to be used not only for his benefit but also for the benefit of the corporation;
meeting the margin calls was necessary to maintain the possibility of the
highly favorable merger. Although Gilbert undoubtedly realized that he
lacked the necessary authorization, he thought he was serving the best
interests of the corporation and he expected his decision to be ratified shortly
thereafter. That Gilbert at no time intended to retain the corporation's
funds is clear from his actions. He immediately informed several of the
corporation's officers and directors, and he made a complete accounting to
all of them within two weeks. He also disclosed his actions to the corporation's outside counsel, a reputable law firm, and followed its instructions
regarding repayment. In signing immediately payable promissory notes
secured by most of his assets, Gilbert's clear intent was to ensure that . ..
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For example, the Ninth Circuit saw fit to reject an automatic
constructive dividend rule in United States v. Miller.7 4 The taxpayer
had been convicted of committing a tax crime in Miller, and the court
accepted the possibility that funds the taxpayer took from the corporation were, for example, a return of capital. The Second Circuit
also expressly rejected the government's argument that any diversion
of corporate funds was income to the shareholder who benefitted,
regardless of whether the corporation had earnings and profits. Instead, in DiZenzo v. Commissioner,171 the Second Circuit required a
determination of the amount of the corporation's earnings and profits
before it would decide if the diverted funds were constructive divi76
dends to a corporation's controlling shareholder.
F.

CORPORATE LOANS TO SHAREHOLDERS

Constructive dividends are sometimes encountered in closely held
corporations when these corporations "loan" money to their shareholders. Courts attempt to discern whether the parties created a bona
fide debtor-creditor relationship. Some indication of this problem is
given by Regulation section 1.301-1(m), which provides that the
"cancellation of indebtedness of a shareholder by a corporation shall
be treated as a distribution of property." This statement is accurate,
but underplays other themes running throughout the area.
Whether an investor who has "borrowed" money from her
corporation has placed her money in a corporation as debt or as
equity is part of a larger debate about "debt v. equity" in corporate
tax. A variety of factors tends to lead shareholders to favor loans to
[the corporation from which he took money] would obtain full restitution.
In addition, he attempted to sell his shares of ...stock [bought on margin]

in order to raise cash to pay ... [the corporation from which he took the

funds] back immediately.
Id. at 480-81 (footnotes and citations omitted). This passage is indicative of how
courts continue to find James pertinent in the constructive dividend area, even if
embezzled funds have not led directly to constructive dividends since James was
decided.
174. 545 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 930 (1977). See
generally Ira L. Tilzer, May the IRS Ignore the Character of Diverted Funds in
Criminal Tax Cases?, 46 J. TAX'N 308 (1977).
175. 348 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1965) (reconstruction of income; good review of
law).

176. See also Gilbert v. Commissioner, 552 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1977) (diversion
of corporate funds argument rejected); Truesdell v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1280
(1987) (acq.) (diversion of corporate funds treated as constructive dividends; good
summary of area).
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corporations over purchasing stock, such as the deductibility of the
payments to the shareholder as interest under section 163 and the
greater protection afforded the investor under state law should the
investment sour. Different issues are at play here, however, because
it is the corporation that is allegedly loaning money to the shareholder,
not the shareholder that is loaning money to the corporation. Probably
the biggest benefit is that the shareholder does not have income if she
has borrowed money from the corporation, and she does have income
if she has not engaged in a loan.
Example 6: Corporation X is owned entirely by Shareholder
A. A withdraws $10,000 from X.
If this $10,000 withdrawal is a loan to A, she has no
economic benefit on which she will be taxed. This result, of
course, necessitates concluding that the withdrawal is a bona
fide loan. If this withdrawal was made with respect to her
stock, however, then the withdrawal is a constructive dividend
and is income to A. Thus, debt v. equity is as important here
as it is when analyzing investments in a corporation, even
though courts have not been especially articulate in noting the
similarities, and differences, between the two areas.
Courts have tended to apply criteria similar to those they use
when examining investment in a corporation when determining whether
transfers by a corporation to its shareholder are debt or equity. In
Pierce v. Commissioner,'77 the court examined payments made by a
corporation for its dominant shareholder, at the shareholder's request
and for his personal use, such as paying alimony to his ex-wife. In
rendering its decision, the court placed considerable weight on the
fact that the shareholder had, at all relevant times, expected to repay
the loans. Furthermore, the transfers were recorded on the corporation's books as loans, were secured by assets of the shareholder, and
were evidenced by notes signed by the shareholder. The shareholder
also had made substantial repayment on these loans. Finally, the loans
to the shareholder far exceeded loans made to the other, 500,
shareholder, so that the loans had not been made in a manner
proportionate to each shareholder's percentage of ownership, which
is one sign that a "loan" is really an investment in stock. Therefore,
these advances were characterized by the Tax Court as loans, not as
constructive dividends.

177. 61 T.C. 424 (1974) (acq. in result in part).
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. A loan was also perceived to exist in Gilbert v. Commissioner.171
There, a lumber company's principal shareholder took money from
the corporation in order to cover margin calls on stock he had
purchased in another lumber company he hoped to merge into the
first company. The Internal Revenue Service emphasized the shareholder's taking the money without the corporation's knowledge,
likening it to cases regarding embezzlement, which would have imputed income to him because of his use and control of the funds. 79
The Second Circuit disagreed, however, determining both that some
of the corporation's directors knew about the withdrawals and that
the shareholder had intended to repay the withdrawals. Therefore,
these withdrawals constituted a loan and did not result in taxable
income to the shareholder.
These cases do not address another compelling aspect of corporate
loans to shareholders-interest free loans. Interest free loans or below
market loans have been problematic in the past. In Dean v. Commissioner, 80 recipients of interest free loans from their corporation were
held not to have derived an economic benefit includable in their
income. Other courts generally followed Dean, the Internal Revenue
Service's resistance notwithstanding. For example, in Harden v. United
States, 18 1 the principal shareholder of a closely held corporation
annually took interest free loans from the corporation in lieu of
having himself paid a salary during the year. At the end of the year,
he would take a salary based upon the company's performance and
offset the loans. Any excess of the loans over the salary would be
evidenced by a note. As in Dean, the court refused to treat the interest
free loan as income taxable to the shareholder.
Congress enacted section 7872 in 1984. This statute subjects loans
made below an interest rate determined by federal regulation. Section
7872(c)(1)(C) specifically provides that such loans, if made between a
corporation and one of its shareholders, are subject to the statute.
Section 7872(c)(1)(B) also provides that such loans associated with
compensation, e.g., between an employer and her employee, are
subject to the statute. Either subsection might apply to loans made
by a corporation to one of its shareholders. Proposed Regulation
section 1.7872-4(d), however, presumes that a loan that might be
characterized as either, will be treated as a corporation-shareholder
178. 552 F.2d at 481-82.

179. See text accompanying notes 171-176 supra.
180. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961) (nonacq.).
181. 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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loan and establishes a relatively low threshold for meeting the presumption. A shareholder of a corporation that is not publicly held
will be presumed to have a corporation-shareholder loan if she owns
over five percent of the corporation's stock. Section 7872(c)(3) provides, however, a $10,000 floor for loans subject to it, such that even
if a below market loan has been made, it is not subject to section
7872 if it is for less than $10,000.
If the loan is for a specific term, the creditor is treated by section
7872(b)(1) as having transferred to the debtor the amount loaned, less
the present value of all payments the debtor is required to make. If
the transfer is made by the corporation to the shareholder, it might
be treated as compensation or dividend or, if made by the shareholder
to the corporation, as contribution to capital. Section 7872(b)(2) also
subjects term loans to the original issue discount rules, sections 127175, such that interest deductions might be imputed to the borrower
and interest income to the creditor. 8 2 If the loan is payable on
demand, section 7872(a)(1) treats the interest the lender could have,
but did not, charge as having been transferred by the creditor to the
borrower and then transferred by the borrower back to the lender as
interest. Thus, if the creditor is the borrower's corporation, the
recipient is likely to be treated as having received a dividend or
compensation. Her "payment" to the corporation is treated as interest, which she may be entitled to deduct and which the corporation
is required to include in its income.' 83
If the transaction is not a loan, then the payment may be regarded
as a constructive dividend. For example, in Alterman Foods, Inc. v.
United States, 8 4 the court addressed a factual situation nearly the
opposite of that examined in Pierce. Here, the taxpayer, a closely
held parent corporation, had required as part of its agreement with
its subsidiaries that all their gross receipts were to be paid to it.
Noting traditional indices of a loan, the court treated the advances of
the gross receipts as constructive dividends. It was especially persuaded
by the way in which the amount of the advances increased as the
subsidiaries generated more profits and that there was little actual
repayment, other than to cover the subsidiaries' expenses.' 85
182. For a discussion of § 7872, see generally BITTKER AND LOKKEN, supra note
149, at ch. 58.
183. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-10(a)(5) (treating below market loans associated

with future services as demand loans).

184. 611 F.2d 866 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (per curiam).
185. See also Crowley v. Commissioner, 962 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1992) (four
brothers owned stock of corporation and could make discretionary withdrawals from
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Some cases question the timing of the income resulting from the
6
corporation-shareholder transaction. In Shephard v. Commissioner,'
the court held that a corporation's payments on notes upon which it

and its shareholder were jointly liable were income to his estate when
the corporation forgave the loan after his death, not income when it
made payments on the debt. Payment was the time for inclusion in
income, however, in Maher v. Commissioner,"7 where a corporation
assumed a debt of the shareholder and he remained secondarily liable
on the notes. Other than the secondary liability in Maher, there is no
apparent difference between the cases. Primary liability, as was created
in Shephard, however, would seem to argue even more strongly in
favor in attributing income to the shareholder as payments are made,
such that the contrary result should have been reached in Shephard.SS
The most that can be said in favor of the result reached in Shephard
is that the shareholder's refusal to repay the corporation for the
money owed it was not clearly established until the shareholder's
estate refused to repay the debt when the corporation requested
repayment. Some evidence of this was the corporation and shareholder's treatment of the whole transaction as a series of debts during the
shareholder's life.
G.

PAYMENTS AMONG COMMONLY CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS

If Shareholder A's corporation, X, is considered to have paid
her a constructive dividend when she uses it to cover a personal
expense or to loan her money without charging interest, what happens
when A owns two corporations, X and Y, and causes X to make a
payment to ? Even though cash never passes through A's hands,
does she have a dividend?
This particular aspect of constructive dividends is distinguished
from other areas by the fact that multiple corporations are involved,
with the resulting consequence that the benefit to the shareholder may
be more difficult to discern. The multiple corporations may be
corporation; held, taxpayer/brother's withdrawal treated as constructive dividend);
Busch v. Commissioner, 728 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1984) (sole shareholder/taxpayer's
withdrawals from corporation, primarily to build new building for corporation; held,
constructive dividends); Spheeris v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 944 (1961) (taxpayer's withdrawal of funds from corporation
evidenced by book entries, but not by notes, nor did he offer collateral, nor had the
corporation paid dividends; held, constructive dividends).
186. 340 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813 (1965).
187. 469 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1972).
188. See also Rev. Rul. 77-360, 1977-2 C.B. 86 (accords with Maher).
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arranged horizontally, with a shareholder owning the stock of several
companies, which are known as "brother-sister" corporations. Alternatively, the shareholder may own the stock of one corporation,
which then owns the stock of another corporation, in a vertical,
"parent-subsidiary," arrangement.
A frequently cited case in this area, Sammons v. Commissioner,8 9
offers a lead in analyzing the relationship between constructive dividends and commonly controlled corporations. In Sammons, the tax-

payer owned most of the stock of one corporation, which owned the
stock of another corporation, and the second corporation owned the
stock of a third corporation. The taxpayer guaranteed commercial
loans made to the third corporation, even though the second corporation agreed to indemnify the taxpayer should he make payment on
the guarantee, and, at some point in time, substituted his note for
the guarantee. When the third company's economic position soured,
the taxpayer's other companies stepped in and transferred funds to
the third corporation, by buying its preferred stock, sufficient to
permit the taxpayer to be repaid the advances he had made on his

note when the third corporation was unable to pay its debts.
The Sammons court established a two-part test for constructive
dividends among commonly controlled corporations: was there a
distribution, and was it "designed

primarily to benefit the sto-

ckowner."' 19 As is so often the case with constructive dividend cases,
the court then became embroiled in a factual determination whether

these two elements of the test had been met. Although the second

prong is more often the issue of contention in these cases, it was not
189. 472 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1972).
190. Id. at 451. More fully, the court states:
[I]t is often necessary to resort to a bifurcated inquiry to test for dividend
equivalence. In every case, the transfer must be measured by an objective
test: did the transfer cause funds or other property to leave the control of
the transferor corporation and did it allow the stockholder to exercise
control over such funds or property either directly or indirectly through
some instrumenality other than the transferor corporation. If this first assay
is satisfied by a transfer of funds from one corporation to another rather
than by a transfer to the controlling shareholder, a second, subjective test
of purpose must also be satisfied before dividend characterization results.
Though a search for intent or purpose is not ordinarily prerequisite to
discovery of a dividend, such a subjective test must necessarily be utilized
to differentiate between the normal business transactions of related corporations and those transactions designed primarily to benefit the stockowner ....
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problematic for the Fifth Circuit. The taxpayer had benefitted because
the third company acquired "sufficient funds to pay the debts owed"
the taxpayer. 191 Instead, the Fifth Circuit was unable to determine
that the first part of the test, the distribution requirement, had been
met. The court was impressed by the uniqueness presented by the
vertical structure of these corporations. Assuming a hypothetical
situation involving a corporation at the top, the "Parent," and its
subsidiary, "Subsidiary," the court said:
After a transfer of funds down the corporate chain of ownership, as in the paradigm example above, the stockholder of
Parent has no more control over or right to the money than
he did before the transfer occurred. His only interest in the
funds after the transfer is that which redounds to him through
his ownership of Parent. Though he may indirectly benefit
from the transfer of the funds and their employment by
Subsidiary in some other corporate activity, the benefit could
be no different in substance than that which he might realize
from a shift of funds within the same corporate entity.192
Fortunately for the tax advisor, several other cases more easily
illustrate situations in which distributions have been considered to
occur, as well as a variety of shareholder purposes. In Stinnet's
Pontiac Service, Inc. v. Commissioner,193 a taxpayer used a corpora191. Id.
192. Id. at 453. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 396 (3d Cir.
1990) (insurance premiums paid by corporation's affiliates to one of its subsidiaries;
no constructive dividend because payments made to obtain insurance, not for
shareholder/parent's benefit); Joseph Lupowitz Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 497
F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974) (informal transfers between shareholder's two corporations;
one corporation got benefit of interest-free use of other corporation's money, but
this did not rise to the level of a shareholder benefit that would result in a constructive
dividend).
Sammons is also one of several cases that raises, then fails to address, the
applicability of § 482 to this area. Other cases raising § 482, but not relying on §
482, include Sparks Nugget, Inc. v. Commissioner, 458 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied sub nom. Graves v. Commissioner, 410 U.S. 928 (1973) (court rejected
taxpayer's argument to apply § 482, to the exclusion of applying a constructive
dividend rationale); Rev. Rul. 78-83, 1978-1 C.B. 79 (§ 482 noted, but not explicitly
applied). For the applicability of § 482, see generally Barry H. Frank, Brother-Sister
Transfer of Funds, 53 TAXEs 693 (1975); Michael Loening, Section 482 Allocations
Resulting in The Creation of Income or in Constructive Dividends to Shareholders,
30 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX'N 1247 (1972). For § 482 generally, see BITTKER AND
LOKKEN, supra note 148, at ch. 79.
193. 730 F.2d 634 (1lth Cir. 1984).
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tion he controlled to make contributions he was compelled to give to
another corporation. The court had little difficulty pinpointing an
actual distribution-the first corporation had distributed money to
the taxpayer which he had used to make contributions to the second
corporation-nor did it have much difficulty perceiving the shareholder purpose here-permitting the taxpayer to retain his interest in
the second corporation, an interest he would have relinquished had
he failed to make the contribution.
As with constructive dividends more generally, the benefits have
94
taken a variety of forms. In Sparks Nugget, Inc. v. Commissioner,
the shareholder acquired land which he then contributed to one of
his corporations which, in turn, leased the land to its sister corporation. The terms of the lease were such that the rent covered the first
corporation's debt service on the land, debt it had assumed when the
shareholder contributed the property to it. This rent was clearly
excessive,' 95 and thus resulted in the benefit to the shareholder that
he was not required to secure additional capital for the first corporation, as he would have been required, if it had been required to
service the debt itself. Excessive compensation was also at stake in
Revenue Ruling 78-83.,96
Some cases more explicitly concern purported loans. In an articulate review of the area, the Tax Court held in Gilbert v. Commissioner, 97 that one corporation's transfer of money to its sister
corporation led to a constructive dividend to their common shareholder, the taxpayer. The first corporation-solely owned by the
taxpayer-had borrowed this money from commercial sources, and
transferred the money to the second corporation-50% owned by the
taxpayer-to enable it to redeem the stock of its other shareholder,
the taxpayer's brother. The court did concede that the transaction
had one indicia of a loan, repayment. The second corporation,
however, had repaid the first corporation only under apparent duress,
over two years after it had received the money from the first corporation. Because the taxpayer had benefitted-he became sole shareholder of the second corporation using the first corporation's financial
strength-the first corporation's transfer of funds to the second

194. 458 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom., Graves v. Commissioner, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
195. The court concluded that the rent constituted a 450 rate of return. Id. at
636.
196. Id. at 636-37 (shareholder benefit not clearly articulated).
197. 74 T.C. 60 (1980).
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corporation was considered a constructive dividend to the taxpayer,
not a loan by one corporation to its sister. 19
CONCLUSION

Differentials between various types of statutes-who is the taxpayer, at what rate is the income taxed-inevitably leads to taxpayers
trying to meet favorable characterizations and to avoid negative
characterizations. The present method of taxing corporations and
their shareholders separately, and at differing rates, involves several
differentials. As a consequence, the history of characterizing dividend
income and assigning it to the appropriate taxpayer, is a rich one.

198. Cf. Cox v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1270 (1971), modified, 58 T.C. 105
(1972) (first corporation borrowed funds commercially, in transaction in which
shareholder acted as endorser, to buy questionable notes from third parties from its
sister corporation; second corporation's later repurchase of same notes from first
corporation after first corporation became insolvent constituted constructive dividend
to shareholder because he was released from his personal endorsement on the
commercial loan); see also P.R. Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1084 (9th
Cir. 1987) (delayed payment of money owed by one corporation to another constituted
constructive dividend to shareholder because first corporation benefitted from interest-free use of money; retention of fees owed to the second corporation by a third
corporation, one owned by shareholder's children, also treated as constructive
dividend).

